Program Audit Results

Police

Services

April 2004

Table of Contents

Introduction

The performance review of the Police Services program commenced in late 2002 and was carried out as part of the effort to audit all City programs over the course of several years. This review was conducted in conjunction with the review of two other Public Safety programs: Animal Control and Emergency Preparedness. A review of the Fire Services program commenced in 2003. The fifth and final Public Safety program, Administrative and Technical Services, is slated for future review.

The FY 2001/2002 budget provided $19.5 million and 292,000 work hours for achievement of the Police Services program goals. This represented 45% of the total Public Safety budget of $43.3 million and 19.5% of the City's general fund.

More resources are allocated to this program than to any other, except Solid Waste. More resources are allocated to this program than any city *department,* except Public Works. In addition to being one of the City's most expensive programs, Police Services is also one of Sunnyvale's most highly visible and essential operations.

The purpose of the performance audit of the Police Services Program was to review the FY 2001/2002 results of the program, SDP, and activity measures. The audit team wishes to thank the Public Safety staff, including Capt. Greg Kevin, Diana Dazzo, Anna Debattista, Laura Gentry, Lt. Walter Lee, Pamela Messier, Erika Tano, and Heather Tannehill for their extensive and patient assistance. We would like to especially commend former Capt. Kirk Sanfilippo for the immense assistance he provided. Without his efforts, the report that follows would not have been possible.

Scope and Methodology

Audit staff gathered and reviewed all written procedures (SOPs) for the program's outcome measures and activities. Staff evaluated the methodology employed for reporting results for FY 2001/2002, as well as the documentation used for those calculations and the mathematical accuracy of the reported figures. Although some findings and recommendations touch on the program's organization, operations, efficiency or efficacy, these elements were not the focus of the review. While some findings and recommendations relate to the merits of the measures themselves, this also was not the focus of the review. It should be noted that this report does not specifically address current reporting methodologies. As a consequence of the program management's laudable efforts to improve the accuracy of reported results, extensive new methodologies were implemented during the course of this audit. These new methods may or may not be consistent with this audit's findings or recommendations. (See Appendix B for an overview of current and former reporting methodologies.)

Since there were no results reported for SubSDP measures in FY 2001/2002, the audit report does not address those measures. This report also does not address allocated activities, since those dollars and hours are allocated to the direct activities, and does not address activities that were defunct as of FY 2001/2002. However, audit staff

recommends that allocations be critically reviewed and problems addressed by Police Services management prior to the development of the FY 2004/2005 budget.

While the focus of the audit was not an evaluation of operations, in those instances where general operating practices appeared to have played a significant role in impacting the quality of reported results or products, those issues have been noted in this report.

This audit found the same general types of problems that were identified by the FY 2000/2001 performance audit of the Public Safety portion of the Columbia Neighborhood Center program. Specifically, that audit identified the following:

> "Testwork and observations indicate serious issues of accountability and coordination for the Columbia related measures within the Public Safety Department. Due to staffing changes, the responsibility for these measures was not clearly reassigned. As a result, the calculations were not reviewed and data was not maintained in Public Safety."

It should be noted that those conclusions were disputed by DPS management. This audit found evidence of similar issues affecting the Police Services program in the following year (FY 2001/2002). The evidence of those problems is detailed throughout this report. A summary is provided in *Section I: Programwide Findings and Recommendations.*

It should be noted, however, that management undertook significant efforts during the course of this audit to compensate for errors in the original results reported for FY 2001/2002. For instance, management gathered new data and conducted new analysis and submitted changes to the original reported results for 14 of the program's activities. In those cases where the reported results were changed, this audit evaluated the latest figures reported. Those figures are captured in the Period 8 Program Progress Report (MBO) for FY 2002/2003.

This audit did not seek to examine the accuracy of timecard data. However, in the course of the audit, numerous instances surfaced in which hours appear to have been charged to incorrect activities. This report notes those instances and makes very broad estimates of the implications of those apparent mischarges. The estimates are based on inferences and are intended to give the reader a feel for the apparent scale of the problem. Under no circumstances should these estimates be taken as representations of actual hours spent on a given activity.

Shortly before the draft release of this report, audit staff was informed that the restructure of the department was well underway. The audit team received working draft papers showing the new structure and proposed measures and activities. Audit staff is concerned that the issues raised in this report are not addressed in the initial restructure proposal, which was developed largely with the assistance of an outside consultant. The process is

being compressed in order to meet deadlines associated with production of the City Budget.

Background

The Police Services program exists to promote actual and perceived safety. Police are tasked with the protection of lives, property, and rights of all people, the deterrence and prevention of crime, the apprehension and prosecution of offenders, and the maintenance of order. Its staff is expected to resolve conflicts, maintain a safe and orderly flow of traffic, and provide prompt response to incidents requiring immediate police attention.

There are at least six major factors that have created unique challenges in the measurement of this program's outcomes, products and work hours. These factors are:

- Public Safety was among the first departments to try to measure its outcomes;
- Measuring Police Services outcomes is inherently difficult;
- Some of the current measures are poorly designed;
- Management and staff turnover in the department and program has been significant and continuous; and,
- The written procedures for documenting and calculating outcomes are generally poor.

Measuring the outcomes associated with Police Services is challenging. Most Police Services measures attempt to quantify the *absence* of something – the absence of crime and traffic accidents and the lack of citizen fearfulness. Although one arguably could know with some certainty how attractive the parks are, one can never know with certainty what crimes have not occurred or how many traffic accidents did not happen. While we can survey people who, without Parks and Recreation, would have been deprived of recreational programs, we cannot survey people who, without the efforts of Police Services, would have been deprived of safety. In addition, much of the data needed for the calculations is itself complex and full of nuance, and it is often stored or tracked in ways that are time consuming or require substantial expertise to extract, interpret or analyze.

Since the existing procedures for calculating the results for the program were approved in 1997, there have been major changes in the personnel responsible for understanding and reporting on the program's outcomes. There have been three different department directors, and by the time of commencement of this audit, the Police Services program itself had been managed by four different people. In 1999, three Commanders, who had long assumed responsibility for budget-related matters, including reporting of results, left the department. Since then, budget-related matters have been delegated to a variety of individuals.

Nonetheless, outcome and product reporting for the program might have been more robust in spite of these problems if the written procedures for gathering, storing and analyzing data had been better. The combination of poorly designed measures, poor

instructions, lack of institutional memory and competing priorities all impacted results for FY 2001/2002.

It should be noted that this report focuses on the results that were reported for FY 2001/2002 and that, in many cases, the methodology used to track results has since been altered. Therefore, this report primarily describes past results and past procedures, some of which deviate from current practices.

The fact that new procedures were implemented while the audit was under way presented both challenges and opportunities. As this report will show, having information generated by a new methodology in the audit year in some cases enabled the auditors to generate "ballpark" estimates of the extent of errors in the prior year. However, the addition of entirely new methodologies substantially slowed the progress of the audit, as the auditors worked to understand three different processes: the procedures as they were originally intended (in the SOPs), the procedures that were actually used in FY 2001/2002, and the procedures that were implemented throughout FY 2002/2003. Although results and processes in FY 2002/2003 were not the focus of the audit, this review provides comments regarding new processes where relevant.

It should be noted that many of the new procedures, while they may improve the accuracy of reported results, may still not resolve underlying issues described in Section I and in the FY 2000/2001 Columbia audit.

Furthermore, the original budget reduction packages proposed for the FY 2003/2004 budget included elimination of staff that Police Services management has indicated is required to carry out the new processes. Although those cuts were not implemented, it is unclear what processes should be codified now and followed in the future. The current processes may not be sustainable. For an overview of the different reporting methodologies, see Appendix A.

Summary of Main Findings

1. To a significant degree, patrol work hours and costs were charged to incorrect activities in FY 2001/2002.

2. To a significant degree, reported products were inaccurate or cannot be substantiated due to lack of documentation.

3. The high degree of inaccuracy in FY 2001/2002, coupled with the extensiveness of effort put forth in FY 2002/2003 to improve the accuracy, suggests that reporting of accurate results was not among the program's highest of priorities in FY 2001/2002.

4. Many of the program's outcome measures are poorly designed. In some cases, the practical effect of this is that small changes in actual performance would result in large differences in reportable results. In other cases, large changes in performance would result in insignificant differences in reportable results. This impinges on the ability of the program to demonstrate its real successes or shortcomings, which could affect the program's ability to allocate resources to the areas of greatest need.

5. The majority of written procedures (SOPs) for calculating reportable results and products are poorly written and provide inadequate assistance to staff.

6. In an effort to improve reporting, this program has replaced the City's timecard system as a mechanism for tracking patrol officers' time.

Audit Findings and Recommendations

Section I: Program-wide Findings and Recommendations

During the course of the review it became evident that many inaccurately reported results in FY 2001/2002 were manifestations of a lack of adequate systems in place to ensure accuracy. For example, one activity requires reporting the number of trips taken to transport prisoners to jail, but there was no log sheet available for staff to tally those trips. At the end of the year, staff had to estimate the figure using other available data.

The extensiveness of the errors suggests that during FY 2001/2002, the accurate reporting of products and work hours by patrol officers and lieutenants was not as high a priority as it could have been. As indicated in specific activities later in this report, many work hours were charged to incorrect activities, and product counts frequently were not accurate.

As evidenced by the changes that management has put in place already, management is aware of the problems with reporting of results and is proactively attempting to resolve them. These efforts are commendable, particularly given the inherent challenges of implementing major change in a large and complex organization.

However, many of the solutions put forth, while they may substantially improve the accuracy of some reported results, could present long-range problems, particularly if existing systems are eroded by budget reductions or staff turnover.

Furthermore, the changes being implemented today represent significant departures from longstanding City practices and the ramifications have not been fully explored (see Appendix A.) Audit staff believes that the work hours estimated by the new methodology are in fact closer to hours actually used. Again, however, this is an assumption. Even if the new methodology is better, it may not be sustainable and therefore should be carefully weighed against alternatives.

Finding #1: As will be discussed in detail later in this report, audit staff estimates nearly 43,000 Patrol Division work hours, worth an estimated $2.6 million, were charged to incorrect activities in FY 2001/2002.

The practical effect of this inaccuracy was to over-state the cost of responding to calls for service and under-state the cost of patrolling the city.

Furthermore, management has indicated that numerous patrol division staff had been completing timecards the same way each week, regardless of whether there was variation in the actual activities on which they were working.

Recommendation #1: The simplest, cheapest and most sustainable methodology for tracking employee time and products is the timecard system. It requires little to no processing by administrative or management staff and no additional forms. Its success is not dependent on the efforts of a handful of highly trained individuals. It relies on the knowledge of the staff who performed the work to record the product of that work, as opposed to relying on managers or other staff to research and record the hours and products. However, the system has significant drawbacks for use in the Police Services program, which has demonstrated difficulty in capturing work hours and products by this methodology. Staff in Police Services also dislikes the system. It may be that the system simply doesn't fit well with the nature of the Police Services program efforts. Therefore, audit staff recommends that alternative methodologies be developed and presented – along with their pros and cons – for comparison to both the timecard system and the present methodology. Keeping in mind that every methodology has benefits and drawbacks, the City's policymakers should evaluate the tradeoffs between the various historical, current and as-yet-untried methodologies and select for implementation the preferred alternatives. Those methodologies should be codified in new SOPs. See Appendix A for a comparison of new and prior methodologies. Audit staff suggests holding a "brainstorming session" with the various stakeholders to discuss and develop potential alternatives to the old timecard methodology and the new system. It may be that better alternatives do not exist, but audit staff believes that it's worth exploring the possibilities.

Finding #2: Although Police Services is responsible for little more than two dozen activities, management greatly complicated reporting on the program's results by implementing numerous "sub-activities" that doubled the number of codes used to track officers' time. There is no evidence that management uses – or needs – data at this level of detail. Management has indicated that the volume of sub-activities has impeded the program's ability to capture accurate data. In addition, some of the sub-activities have products that are dissimilar to the products at the activity level. For example, a particular activity records products as the number of cases investigated. Its sub-activity, however, records the number of pieces of evidence collected. Since the sub-activity products "roll up" to the activity, the product count at the activity level will be nonsensical.

Recommendation #2: Staff should eliminate all sub-activities from this program except those for which there is a clear, specific need for such highly specific data. It's unlikely that any Police Services activities need sub-activities.

Finding #3: The extensiveness of inaccurate data reported, and interviews with staff, suggest that staff has in the past perceived the City's outcome-based budget/reporting system as a lot of work in exchange for little programmatic value.

Recommendation #3: The Finance Department, the Office of the City Manager and the Department of Public Safety should collaboratively address this issue as part of the department restructure so that DPS staff find the new measures and activities to be "value added" instead of simply burdensome. In addition, a training program with an intensive support component for Public Safety staff may help to eliminate some of the frustration.

Lastly, improvement of the calculation procedures so that they provide clear direction would serve to reduce the difficulty involved in trying to report on program performance.

Finding #4: Most of the program's outcome measures are poorly designed: they are convoluted, ineffectual and complex. Some measures are convoluted to the point that the *meaning* of reported results is unclear, and some measures simply fail to capture the success or failure of program efforts. Due to the complexity of the measures and the complexity of the data used to report results, staff struggles with the calculations.

Recommendation #4: As part of the current restructure, staff should carefully re-evaluate the measures to ensure that they are focused on the essence of the program's efforts and that the measures themselves – and their results – have meaning and thus value. The measures should be designed such that data undergoes minimal contortion and such that staff has a reasonable chance of success in capturing and manipulating the data used to report results.

Finding #5: Virtually all of the program's existing SOPs provide insufficient guidance to staff in capturing data and reporting results.

Recommendation #5: After revamping the measures, staff should prepare straightforward, detailed procedures for reporting results and should "test" those procedures prior to implementation.

Section II: Program Outcome Measure Findings and Recommendations

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Program Measure #1.

An average seven-year weighted FBI crime index crime rate per 100,000 population 54% below the national weighted FBI crime rate, 63% below the California weighted FBI crime rate, and 38% below the Santa Clara County weighted FBI crime rate is achieved.
-Percentage Below National Crime Rate
-Percentage Below California Crime Rate
-Percentage Below County Crime Rate

The results reported for FY 2001/2002 were 64.7%, 67.9% and 51.5%, respectively. Staff entered index crime rate data from the three external sources, (US, California, Santa Clara County) for each type of crime (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault and burglary). These rates were taken from the Uniform Crime Reports and the California Attorney General's crime rates by county. Sunnyvale's own crime rate data was also entered for comparison. Seven years of rates from each source for each type of crime were summed. That sum was multiplied by a weight specified by the SOP, with more serious crimes weighted more heavily. The sum of the seven years of murder rates, for instance, was multiplied by 10, the largest weight. The product was then divided by 7 to achieve a weighted average for each type of crime. The weighted average for each type of crime was then summed to produce a "score" for each jurisdiction. The percentage that Sunnyvale's score was below the scores for the three external sources was calculated as the reported result for FY 2001/2002. The data was compared as follows: calendar 1994 external data was compared to Fiscal Year 1995/1996 data for Sunnyvale; calendar 2000 external data was compared to fiscal year 2001/2002 data for Sunnyvale.

Finding #1: The measure masks trends and changes in criminal activity in Sunnyvale. Since this measure "purees" together different types of crimes, crime rates in four jurisdictions, a set of arbitrary weights, and seven years' worth of data, meaningful information about crime in Sunnyvale is camouflaged. Because this measure conceals both changes in the volume of crimes and the nature of crimes committed in Sunnyvale, it masks the need for, and use of, Police Services resources.

Recommendation #1: Change the measure to report comparative, non-weighted data for each crime type. For instance, staff can report that the homicide rate in Sunnyvale was X% lower than in Santa Clara County.

Finding #2: It would have been very difficult for Police Services to have failed to meet the FY 2001/2002 goals. For instance, if Sunnyvale's actual crime rates for all index crimes were triple the actual rates in FY 2001/2002 – and there was no increase in the rates for the County and the nation – the goal for FY 2001/2002 would still have been met for both of those comparisons, and nearly met for California (see Appendix C.)

13

Recommendation #2: Establish new goals, by crime type, based on historical crime rates.

Finding #3: This statistic says nothing about crime rates in Sunnyvale – only about the City's rates relative to others' rates. Crime could triple everywhere, including Sunnyvale, and this statistic would remain unchanged. What would change, however, is the amount of resources needed to maintain the status quo.

Recommendation #3: Create an additional new measure that illustrates changes in the amount of crime in Sunnyvale. (See also the recommended measure to replace the existing Program Outcome Measure #7 in that section of this report.)

Finding #4: The statistic captures only relative changes in the occurrence of index crimes while ignoring changes in other types of crimes that have significant impact on the community. Identity theft, for instance, has increased in recent years but that fact is invisible here.

Recommendation #4: In another, non-comparative measure (such as Outcome Measure #7), the City may wish to consider including measures that address non-index crimes.

Finding #5: This measure has been calculated by comparing data for the county, state and national crime rates to data from more recent years for Sunnyvale crime rates. Although this is not a valid comparison, Police Services staff believed that it was preferable to use the most recent data available from Sunnyvale, even though the data from the external sources is much older than that of the City.

Recommendation #5: The City should not compare its data from Year A to external data from Year B, even if the City must use old data to report on this measure. Data should be matched by year.

Finding #6: Staff did not adequately document the data used to calculate this measure. Although the calculations used to create the statistic are well documented, the underlying data used is not. The UCR reports were not retained with the calculation worksheets and there was no documentation provided to the audit team for the calculations of the City's own crime rates for prior years.

Recommendation #6: Staff should retain, for at least five years, all data and worksheets used to calculate reported results.

Finding #7: Using the same data for the number of crimes used to calculate clearance rates, the audit staff was unable to replicate the reported crime rate for robbery, aggravated assault and burglary. The audit staff was able to replicate the rates reported for murder and rape crimes. For instance, the number of burglaries reported in FY 2001/2002 was 427. This equates to a burglary rate of 319 per 100,000 population. However, the rate staff used to calculate the result for this measure was 246.

Recommendation #7: Staff should clearly document the data and assumptions used in calculating reported results. Data regarding the number of crimes that occurred in Sunnyvale should be consistent across different measures.

Program Measure #2.

An average seven-year weighted clearance rate for the crimes of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary 59% above the national weighted clearance rate for these crimes, and 66% above the California weighted clearance rate for these crimes is achieved.

-Percentage Above National Clearance Rate
-Percentage Above California Clearance Rate

The results reported for FY 2001/2002 were 59.9% and 67.5% respectively.

Staff created a spreadsheet and entered national, state and Sunnyvale clearance rates for the listed crimes for seven years. External clearance rates came from the Uniform Crime Reports at the national level and the state Department of Justice for the California rates.

Sunnyvale clearance rates were manually calculated by staff. Staff matched calendar 1994 external data to the City's FY 1995/1996 data. The rates for each type of crime were summed across the seven years and multiplied by the weights specified by the SOP (clearance rates for murder were weighted by 10, etc.) Then the weighted value was divided by the number of years of clearance rates to achieve a weighted average. These averages were summed and divided by 40, which is the sum of the weights (10, 10, 8, 7 and 5.)

Finding #1: This measure has been calculated by comparing old data for state and national crime rates to relatively new data for Sunnyvale crime rates. Although this is not a valid comparison, Police Services staff believed that it was preferable to use the most recent data available from Sunnyvale, even though the data from the external sources is much older than that of the City.

Recommendation #1: The City should not compare its data from Year A to external data from Year B, even if the City must use old data to report on this measure. Data should be matched by year, as was done in the calculation of results for FY 2002/2003.

Finding #2: The measure masks trends/changes in crimes solved in Sunnyvale and the need for resources. (See Program Measure #1.)

Recommendation #2: Eliminate the weights and report comparative data for each crime type. (See Program Measure #1.)

Finding #3: If the statistic were to move dramatically, the reader would not know what was driving the change. (See Program Measure #1.)

Recommendation #3: Eliminate the weights and report comparative data for each crime type.

Finding #4: This statistic says nothing about rates of Sunnyvale's clearance rates – only about the City's rates relative to others' rates.

Recommendation #4: Since they are already calculated in order to report the existing statistic, audit staff recommends reporting Sunnyvale's clearance rates along with those of the other jurisdictions.

Finding #5: The statistic captures only relative changes in clearances of selected crimes, while ignoring clearance rates in other types of crimes. (See Program Measure #1.)

Recommendation #5: The City may wish to expand the crimes for which its own clearance rates are reported.

Finding #6: This statistic gives undue weight to a few crimes, which can create an inaccurately positive or negative impression of the program's overall success in solving crimes.

In the case of FY 2001/2002, the results calculated were based on the clearance rates for 601 crimes in Sunnyvale, 71% of which were burglaries. Of the 601 crimes, 277 (46%) were cleared, as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1 - Raw Data for FY 2001/2002						
Crime Type		**Reported Crimes**		**Cleared Crimes**		**Rate**
Murder		1		0		0.00%
Rape		20		15		75.00%
Robbery		70		28		40.00%
Assault w/deadly weapon		83		64		77.11%
Burglary (excluding autos)		427		170		39.81%
Total		601		277		46.09%
Source: *DPS "Investigations Statistics, Reporting Period 13"*						

However, DPS data indicated that 5 homicides had been cleared at some time during the 7-year span:

- 1 in 1995/1996
- 2 in 1989/1990
- 2 in 1990/2000
- 1 in 2001/2002

After weighting, the clearance rates for these 6 crimes accounted for 33.9% of the average of weighted values (1,000%/2,952%), as shown in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Weighted 7-Year Average

	SV95/96	SV96/97	SV97/98	SV 98/99	SV 99/00	SV 00/01	SV 01/02	Sum of 7 Yrs	Weight	WGTVAL	AVG
MURDER	200.00%	N/A	N/A	100.00%	100.00%	N/A	0.00%	400.00%	10	4000.00%	1000.00%
RAPE	77.00%	75.00%	81.00%	73.00%	73.00%	85.00%	75.00%	539.00%	10	5390.00%	770.00%
ROBBERY	51.00%	60.00%	64.00%	50.00%	51.00%	51.00%	40.00%	367.00%	8	2936.00%	419.43%
AG-ASS	77.00%	84.00%	77.00%	82.00%	82.00%	83.00%	77.00%	562.00%	7	3934.00%	562.00%
BURG	41.00%	38.00%	42.00%	44.00%	39.00%	37.00%	40.00%	281.00%	5	1405.00%	200.71%
											2952.14%

The sum of 7 years of rates multiplied by weight

Sum of weighted averages

Comparison Statistic   73.80%

Sum of average divided by the sum of weights (40)

Source: DPS calculation spreadsheet

The practical effect of this weighting is that very small changes in homicide clearances – or even the number of reported homicides – creates material changes in the *appearance* of the program's overall performance. Consider the effect of minor changes in the examples below:

Table A: Actual Data for Calculation of 2002/2003 Results

Calendar Year
Clearance Rates for Sunnyvale

		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	7YR
MURDER		100.00%	100.00%	N/A*	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	N/A*	800%
RAPE		58.62%	75.86%	69.23%	60.00%	68.00%	47.06%	66.67%	636%
ROBBERY		51.82%	63.75%	45.95%	65.57%	43.48%	41.86%	50.85%	415%
AG-ASSLT		86.61%	69.67%	76.32%	85.58%	69.53%	83.08%	82.52%	553%
BURGLARY		32.46%	30.24%	29.72%	27.14%	23.03%	16.56%	19.03%	127%
WEIGHTED AVERAGE									63.30%

		Sunnyvale	Result	
National	45.80%	63.30%	38.21%	National
State	43.52%	63.30%	45.44%	California

Source: *DPS Calculation Spreadsheet*

In this actual example, Sunnyvale's statistic is 38% better than the national statistic and 45% better than that of the state.

Table B: Hypothetical Data in Which the Homicide Clearance Rate in 1999 is 0%

Calendar Year
Clearance Rates for Sunnyvale

		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	7YR
MURDER		100.00%	100.00%	N/A*	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	N/A*	600%
RAPE		58.62%	75.86%	69.23%	60.00%	68.00%	47.06%	66.67%	636%
ROBBERY		51.82%	63.75%	45.95%	65.57%	43.48%	41.86%	50.85%	415%
AG-ASSLT		86.61%	69.67%	76.32%	85.58%	69.53%	83.08%	82.52%	553%
BURGLARY		32.46%	30.24%	29.72%	27.14%	23.03%	16.56%	19.03%	127%
WEIGHTED AVERAGE									58.3%

		Sunnyvale	Result	
National	45.80%	58.3%	27.30%	National
State	43.52%	58.3%	33.96%	California

Note that if the homicide that occurred in 1999 had not been cleared, the statistic would have been substantially worse, with Sunnyvale's weighted clearance rate being only 27% better than the national rate, compared to 38% better as represented in Table A. In other words, due to the weighting, this example shows how <u>overall reportable performance declines by as much as 29% based on the failure to clear *one* crime.</u>

Furthermore, if the police had had one fewer reported homicide, its <u>reportable performance</u> would have been worse, as illustrated in Table C on the next page.

Table C: Hypothetical Data in Which No Homicides Occurred in 1999

Calendar Year
Clearance Rates for Sunnyvale

		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	7YR
MURDER		100.00%	100.00%	N/A*	100.00%	NA	0.00%	N/A*	750%
RAPE		58.62%	75.86%	69.23%	60.00%	68.00%	47.06%	66.67%	636%
ROBBERY		51.82%	63.75%	45.95%	65.57%	43.48%	41.86%	50.85%	415%
AG-ASSLT		86.61%	69.67%	76.32%	85.58%	69.53%	83.08%	82.52%	553%
BURGLARY		32.46%	30.24%	29.72%	27.14%	23.03%	16.56%	19.03%	127%
WEIGHTED AVERAGE									62.05%

		Sunnyvale	Result	
National	45.80%	62.05%	35.48%	National
State	43.52%	62.05%	42.57%	California

In this example, having one less homicide *occur* in the 7-year period causes the weighted clearance rate to be worse than if the homicide occurred and was cleared, as shown in Table A. The reportable performance compared to the national data in this example is 7% worse than if a murder had occurred and was cleared. In this manner, the weighting feature of this measure is counter to police efforts to prevent homicides.

<u>**Recommendation #6:**</u> Remove the weights from the calculation.

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Program Measure #3.
The Budget/Cost ratio is at 1.
-Ratio

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The result reported for FY 2001/2002 was 1.05, meaning that the program came in under budget.

Finding #1: The result was properly calculated and reported. While there are underlying issues associated with the relationship of this measure to the index score, these are not addressed in the body of this audit report because of the citywide nature of this measure. See Appendix E for a discussion of this measure.

Recommendation #1: The measure should be re-examined on a citywide basis due to its potential to artificially inflate the index score.

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Program Measure #4.
A traffic collision ratio per million miles traveled at the previous 3-year average is achieved.
-Ratio

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The result reported for FY 2001/2002 was 2.16 accidents per million miles.

Public Safety staff calculated the number of traffic accidents on public roadways by deducting the number of private property accidents from the total number of accidents reported to police (as captured in activity 412210.) Staff then obtained from Traffic Engineering the number of miles traveled for the year: 681,612,000. The number of public-property accidents (1,473) was divided by 681 million miles to obtain the number of accidents per mile (0.000002161). This figure was multiplied by 1,000,000 to obtain the rate per million miles.

Finding #1: Because the actual 3-year average is not reported as part of the result, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the goal. Staff has usually compared the 1-year result with the budgeted estimate of the prior 3-year average in order to determine whether the goal was met or not. However, as illustrated by the hypothetical example that follows, the average that was budgeted is not necessarily the same as the actual average.

Historical Actual		
FY 01/02	FY 02/03	FY 03/04
Actual	Actual	Actual
2.9	2.5	3

In mid FY 04/05, the 05/06 Budgeted Goal is Developed		
Prior 3-Year Average		
2.8		

In this hypothetical example, during mid FY '04/05, the FY '05/06 budget is developed. During FY '04/05, the last three years of known ratios are for the fiscal years '01/02 through '03/04. The average of the ratios in these three years is 2.8, as shown above.

At the close of 04/05, an Actual Ratio for that FY is Achieved
Actual
2

At the close of FY '04/05, an actual ratio for that year is achieved. In this hypothetical example, the actual ratio is 2.0. At the time of reporting on FY '05/06 outcomes, the actual "prior three years" are from '02/03 through '04/05. The prior 3-year average is:

Historical Actual		
FY 01/02	FY 02/03	FY 03/04
Actual	Actual	Actual
2.9	2.5	3

In mid FY 04/05, the 05/06 Budgeted Goal is Developed		
Prior 3-Year Average		
2.8		

At the close of 04/05, an Actual Ratio for that FY is Achieved		
Actual		
2		

Actual Prior 3-Year Average in FY 05/06		
Average		
2.5		

This problem of the "skipped year" is exacerbated in those cases when the budgeted goal remains unchanged in the second year of the 2-year operating budget. In those cases, the budgeted goal will exclude two years of actual ratios. In this example, the actual ratio attained in FY '06/07 would be compared to the "prior 3-year average," but that average would be for the years FY '01/02 through FY '03/04. This explains why the budgeted FY '03/04 "prior 3-year average" is exactly the same as the budgeted FY '02/03 "prior 3-year average."

Recommendation #1: At a minimum, the actual 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that there is a record of whether the goal was met or not. Audit staff believes that a better alternative would be to establish a reasonable goal that must be maintained. A 3-year average is subject to significant variation due to an unusually large or small number of accidents in a single year. This means that an anomaly in a single year then affects the goal for several years thereafter, and that goal might be higher or lower than is reasonable. One way to establish a reasonable goal would be to base it on an average of many more years (a dozen, for instance.)

Finding #2: The meaning of this measure is difficult to grasp. One has to dig into the calculation to realize its meaning: that Sunnyvale hoped to hold its traffic accidents to about 5 per day in FY 2001/2002.

Recommendation #2: As part of the restructure, the City should explore alternative measures in an effort to capture this information in a format that is more readily understandable. For instance, staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled. (Such a measure was proposed for use by the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, as shown in Appendix F.)

Program Measure #5.
A community perception of safety rating of 85% is achieved.
-Rating

The result reported in FY 2001/2002 was 98%.

The measure was calculated using the June 2002 and December 2001 citywide surveys. In the survey, respondents were asked the question: "Overall, how safe do you feel in Sunnyvale?" Possible answers were: very safe, fairly safe, somewhat safe, or not safe at all. Using a summary provided by the Gelfond Group, staff summed the percent of respondents who answered very safe or fairly safe for each of the two surveys and divided by 2. (June 2002: (67+32) = 99%; December 2001: (66+31) = 97%; (99+97)/2 = 98%.)

Finding #1: The percent reported was substantiated by the documentation supplied to the audit team.

Program Measure #6.

A response time to emergency police calls for assistance of seven minutes (from time received by dispatch) 90% of the time, and a response time to urgent police calls for assistance of 11 minutes (from time received by dispatch) 90% of the time is achieved.
-Number of Minutes/Emergency
-Number of Minutes/Urgent

The results reported in FY 2001/2002 were: Emergency police calls: 4.96 minutes; Urgent police calls: 9.61 minutes.

When this measure was modified from an earlier version, the written procedure was not updated to indicate how to calculate the result. The phrase "90% of the time" is not defined. Therefore, Police Services staff developed the following procedure:

Emergency Calls
Staff first extracted from the Public Safety Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system all "Emergency" police responses to law-enforcement emergencies. These calls are a portion of the calls classified as "Priority E" in the system. Other "Priority E" calls include calls for fire and other responses. The extraction was conducted in such a way as to exclude police responses to emergency fire calls. Whether a call is "Priority E" is pre-determined by department policy and "hard coded" into the computer system. In FY 2001/2002, the following calls were "Priority E:"

- Accident/Major Injury
- Accident/Unknown Injury
- Accident with Injury
- Accident/Unknown Injury – Fire
- Hit Run/Felony - Just Occurred
- Code 20 (All available units in the city respond)
- Code 30 (All available units in the county respond)
- Multiple Casualty
- Light Plane Crash
- Pursuit
- Shooting
- Stabbing
- Train Crash

The report generated contained 316 calls. (Again, fire emergency calls were omitted.) Staff deleted 58 calls that captured time officers spent training that were erroneously coded as "train crashes" or that were otherwise miscoded. The "adjusted" list of the remaining 244 calls were then rank ordered, beginning with calls with "0" response times and ending with the call with the longest response time. Staff located the call that was at the 90th percentile. The response time of this particular call was 4.96 minutes, or 4 minutes and 58 seconds. This was the reported result.

Urgent Calls

Staff first extracted from the Public Safety dispatch system all "Urgent" calls for police service. These calls are classified as "Priority 2" in the system. Whether a call is "Priority 2" is pre-determined by department policy and "hard coded" into the computer system. In FY 2001/2002, the following calls were "Priority 2:"

- Suicide
- Shots Fired
- Person Called for Help
- Accident with Minor Injury
- Drunk Driving
- Alarm/Hold Up
- Alarm/Panic
- Attempted Suicide
- Shots Heard
- Missing – At Risk
- With a Weapon
- Prowler in Progress
- Explosion Patrol Response
- Stolen Vehicle in Progress
- Kidnap in Progress
- Kidnap Just Occurred
- Robbery with Injury
- Robbery in Progress
- Robbery Just Occurred
- Assault/Fire Needed
- Assault/Battery in Progress
- Assault/Battery Just Occurred
- Assault w/Deadly Weapon with Injury
- Assault w/Deadly Weapon in Progress
- Assault w/Deadly Weapon Just Occurred
- Shoot Dwelling/Car in Progress
- Shoot Dwelling/Car Just Occurred
- Rape in Progress
- Rape Just Occurred
- Child Abuse/Beating in Progress
- Child Abuse/Beating Just Occurred
- Domestic Violence with Injury
- Child Steal in Progress
- Child Steal Just Occurred
- Indecent Exposure
- Disturbance/Fight
- Disturbance/Gang Fight
- Disturbance/Unknown
- Disturbance/Weapons
- Brandish Weapon in Progress

- Burglary/Auto in Progress
- Burglary/Commercial in Progress
- Burglary/Other in Progress
- Burglary/Residential in Progress
- Burglary/School in Progress
- Check Forgery in Progress
- Grand Theft in Progress
- Illegal Entry in Progress
- Child Molestation in Progress
- Barricade
- Foot Chase
- Bomb Threat
- Hostage
- Man with a Gun
- Overdose/Ingest

After removing 10 erroneously coded calls, staff rank ordered the "adjusted list" of the remaining 1,961 calls from "0" response times to the longest response time. Staff located the call that was at the 90th percentile. That call's response time was 9.61 minutes.

Finding #1: There is an inconsistency between the number of calls used to calculate Emergency response times and the number of Emergency calls reported in the emergency call activity. In Activity 412040, Police Services reported responding to 1,255 emergency calls. However, only 244 (less than 20%) of these calls were used as the basis for calculating Emergency response times. This discrepancy occurred because at the activity level, emergency calls were taken to mean "Priority E" and "Priority 1" calls. However, at the program and SDP level, emergency calls were taken to mean only "Priority E" calls. Management stated that the discrepancy was allowed because the SOP (at the program and SDP level) only made reference to "emergency police calls for assistance." Hence, management did not include priority 1 calls (at the program and SDP level).

Recommendation #1: Figures used to report call volume should be consistent with those used to report response times.

Recommendation #2: The program might benefit from a new activity in which to capture the number of police responses to fire emergencies and a new program measure to capture police response times to fire emergencies. The department is already tracking this data but has no appropriate place to report it.

Finding #2: The "adjusted" list of both emergency and urgent calls included a number of response times that were "0." There were a total of 19 emergency calls (almost 8%) and 98 urgent calls (5%) with 0.00 response times. Several other calls had response times of just a few seconds. Audit staff calculated what the 90th percentile response times would have been if the "0" calls had been omitted and concluded that those calls did not materially alter the reported response times for either emergency or urgent calls. However, inclusion of instances in which officers have notified dispatchers that they have

come upon a scene in a measure meant to reflect officers' ability to speedily respond to dispatched emergencies violates the purpose and value of the measure. Audit staff notes that under this system, it is theoretically possible to end up with reportable response times of zero or nearly zero.

Recommendation #3: The written procedures (SOPs) should specify that only those calls that are not self initiated are to be used to calculate the results for this measure. This should eliminate response times of "0" or only a few seconds from inclusion in the data used to calculate the result for this measure.

Finding #3: "Emergency calls" (Priority E) are somewhat arbitrarily defined and do not necessarily conform to expectations of what constitutes an "emergency." A car accident requires an automatic "emergency" police response, but serious crimes in progress – including robberies, assaults and rapes – do not. Those crimes are lumped into the "urgent" response category, along with such offenses as bomb threats, check forgeries and indecent exposure. The particular calls that are classified as "emergencies" have changed at least three times since FY 1995/1996. Note that such changes call into question comparisons of reported results for any given year to results from prior years.

Recommendation #4: As part of the restructure, Public Safety management may wish to evaluate these priorities and possibly research whether these priorities are consistent with public expectations and/or standard police practices.

Finding #4: The measure requires a result in the form of a percent but it is structured such that results must be reported in the form of minutes. This measure actually asks for the percent of time that calls are responded to within a number of minutes, but the measure requires reporting a "minutes" calculation instead.

Finding #5: Staff has been reporting the call that is at the 90th percentile. The phrase "90% of the time" could be construed to mean something other than the value of the call at the 90th percentile of all calls. For instance, it could be construed to mean the average of 90 percent of all calls.

Recommendation #5: For clarity, the measures could be refined as follows: "The percent of emergency police calls for assistance with response times under 7 minutes (from time received by dispatch)" and, "The percent of urgent police calls for assistance with response times under 11 minutes (from time received by dispatch), with the goals set at 90%.

Finding #6: The measure is really two different measures and no current SOP exists for those measures.

Recommendation #6: Create two measures – one for urgent calls and one for emergency calls and prepare procedures for each measure. The SOPs should specify the exact call types to be counted in each response time calculation, lay out the data extraction methodology and indicate which calls may be excluded from the calculation.

Recommendation #7: Data should be extracted via the saved report entitled *"Call Processing Time for PD Calls"* in the CAD Activity Reporting System (CARS) database. If the call types change, the saved report should reflect the changes.

Program Measure #7.

A dollar loss per citizen due to crime and traffic collisions at the prior 3-year average, adjusted for inflation, is achieved.
-Dollar Loss Per Citizen

The reported result for FY 2001/2002 was $234.95. Staff explained the calculation as follows:

Using crime data as reported to the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), staff calculated the property crime loss estimate (minus the estimated value of recovered property), at $3,140,062. Officers who prepare reports of property crimes estimate the value of the property loss, and these values are then reported through the UCR. Staff then divided by the estimated population of 133,983 for a property crime loss per citizen of $23.44.

Next, a figure was calculated for the "dollar loss" for three types of violent crimes: murder, rape and assault. Per the existing procedure, staff used figures from the National Safety Council for auto accidents as proxies for the "cost" of these crimes. For example, each murder was multiplied by $1,000,000 – which is the Safety Council's estimated economic loss for a death in an auto accident – to get the total "dollar loss" for murder. The number of rapes and assaults were multiplied by $35,300 – which is the Safety Council's estimated economic cost for an injury from an auto accident – to get the total "dollar loss" due to rapes and assaults. The sum of these dollar losses was then divided by the population estimate for a "dollar loss per citizen due to violent crime" of $39.61.

Next, staff calculated the dollar loss per citizen due to traffic accidents. Staff multiplied the number of fatal accidents by $2 million, when the figure used should have been $1 million. Staff multiplied the number of injury accidents by $35,300. Next, the estimated value of property damage from auto accidents was calculated using the NSC estimate of $6,500 per accident. The dollar loss estimates for traffic accidents were summed and divided by the estimated population, for a result of $171.91.

The reported total dollar loss per citizen due to crime and traffic collisions was therefore 23.44 + 39.61 + 171.91 = $234.96.

Finding #1: A mathematical error was made in the calculation of the dollar loss for auto accidents.

Finding #2: The measure contains so many disparate elements that reported results are meaningless. Imagine, for instance, that the reported result in FY 2001/2002 had been

$244.96 instead of $234.96. That difference could be attributed to any one of the following combinations of changes:

- 38 more rapes, or,
- 38 more car accidents with injuries, or,
- 1 homicide and 9 injury accidents, or,
- The theft of equipment valued at $1.34 million, or,
- Valuation of non-fatal accidents/crimes at $37,870 instead of $35,300 by the National Safety Council

Conversely, imagine that Police Services' efforts had dramatically reduced identity theft, child abuse, drug sales and domestic violence in FY 2001/2002. The "dollar loss per citizen due to crime and traffic collisions" would have been unchanged at $234.96. Simply put, if Police Services meets this goal, it does not necessarily reflect on the safety of residents or businesses. If Police Services does not meet this goal, that also does not necessarily mean that safety has declined.

Finding #3: Because the actual 3-year average is not reported as part of the result, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the goal.

Finding #4: The values used to estimate the "dollar loss" for crime are in fact an estimated value for loss from accidental injuries and deaths. It does not necessarily follow that the estimates are interchangeable.

Finding #5: The value of stolen property is extremely difficult to estimate and will vary widely based on which officer takes the report. Such estimates may misrepresent the actual value of stolen goods as officers are not trained to value stolen property. Given that these highly variable and unsubstantiated figures represent the largest portion of the basis for the calculation of this statistic further calls into question the validity of the measure as an indicator of the program's efforts to combat crime.

Recommendation #1: Reconstruct this measure so that it captures more information about both workload and performance. The audit team and staff recommend two new measures:

1) "The number of serious crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft and other theft) is at or below the prior three-year average."

Reporting Year number of

- murders
- rapes
- robberies
- aggravated assaults
- burglaries
- auto thefts

- other thefts

Prior three-year average number of

- murders
- rapes
- robberies
- aggravated assaults
- burglaries
- auto thefts
- other thefts

2) "The number of traffic accidents is at or below the prior three-year average."

- Actual number of accidents for the reporting year
- Average number of accidents over the prior 3 years

Program Measure #8.
An overall customer satisfaction rating of 85% for Police Services is achieved.
-Rating

The reported result for FY 2001/2002 was 93.5%.

Using summary data from the June 2002 and December 2001 citywide surveys by the Gelfond Group, staff added together "favorable" ratings for the question "How would you rate the City of Sunnyvale on each of the following services? .... Police protection." The possible answers were Very good, good, average, poor, or very poor. The summary results provided by the Gelfond Group converted these results into "Favorable, neutral, below average." Public Safety summed the "favorable" results of 93% from June 2002 and 94% from December 2001 (93+94) and divided by 2 for the average rating of 93.5%.

Finding #1: The percentage reported was appropriately calculated by staff and substantiated by the documentation supplied to the audit team.

Recommended New Measure
Conviction Rates/DA Complaint Issued

There are at least two activities that capture expenditures directly related to the program's role in convicting those that officers arrest (appearing in court and departmental liaison with prosecutors). There are several other activities that attempt to capture the cost and volume of activity for the "legwork" that leads to convictions (investigate persons crimes, investigate property crimes, etc.) Yet the program does not have a measure to report conviction rates or complaints issued by the District Attorney. Police Services should consider including such a measure in the restructure.

Section III: Service Delivery Plan Measure Findings and Recommendations

A. SDP 41201 – Crime Control and Public Order Maintenance

SDP 01 Measure #1.

An average seven-year weighted FBI crime index crime rate per 100,000 population 54% below the national weighted FBI crime rate, 63% below the California weighted FBI crime rate, an 38% below the Santa Clara County weighted FBI crime rate is achieved.
-Percentage Below National Crime Rate
-Percentage Below California Crime Rate
-Percentage Below County Crime Rate

See findings and recommendations for Program Outcome Measure #1.

SDP 01 Measure #2.

An average seven-year weighted clearance rate for the crimes of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary 59% above the national weighted clearance rate for these crimes, and 66% above the California weighted clearance rate for these crimes is achieved.
-Percentage Above National Clearance Rate
-Percentage Above California Clearance Rate

See findings and recommendations for Program Outcome Measure #2.

SDP 01 – Measure #3

An average (mean) response time to emergency police calls for assistance of four minutes (from time received by dispatch), and an average (mean) response time to urgent police calls for assistance of seven minutes (from time received by dispatch) is achieved.
-Number of Minutes/Emergency
-Number of Minutes/Urgent

Note that this measure is an attempt to measure the same outcome as Program Outcome Measure #6 by using averages instead of percentiles.

The results reported in FY 2001/2002 were 3.06 minutes for emergency calls and 5.59 minutes for urgent calls. These results were obtained by averaging the response times of the same sets of calls used to report the results for Program Outcome Measure #6.

Finding #1: Findings 1-4 and 6 and recommendations 1-4 and 6-7 for Program Outcome Measure #6 apply to this measure as well.

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SDP – 01 Measure #4.

A dollar loss per citizen - due to property crime - at the prior 3-year average, adjusted for inflation, is achieved.

-Dollar Loss Per Citizen

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This measure "rolls up" into Program Outcome Measure #7. The reported result for FY 2001/2002 was $23.44.

Using data reported on the Uniform Crime Reports, staff calculated the property crime loss estimate (minus the estimated value of recovered property) for the year at $3,140,062. Staff then divided by the estimated population of 133,983, for a property crime loss per citizen of $23.44.

Finding #1: The findings associated with the property crime component of Program Outcome Measure #7 apply to this measure as well.

Recommendation #1: Audit staff recommends eliminating this measure and replacing it with a measure that would "roll up" to the recommended new Program Outcome Measure #7, as follows:

"The number of serious property crimes (burglary, auto theft and other theft) is at or below the prior three-year average."

Reporting Year number of
- burglaries
- auto thefts
- other thefts

Prior three-year average number of
- burglaries
- auto thefts
- other thefts

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SDP 01 – Measure #5.

A community perception of safety rating of 85% is achieved.

-Rating

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This measure is identical to Program Outcome Measure #5.

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SDP 01- Measure #6.

A customer satisfaction rating of 85% for Police Services is achieved.

-Rating

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This measure is the same as Program Outcome Measure #8.

B. SDP 41202 – Traffic Safety

SDP 02 – Measure #1.

A ratio of traffic collisions per million miles traveled at the previous 3-year average is achieved.
-Ratio

This measure is the same as Program Outcome Measure #4.

SDP 02 – Measure #2.

A ratio of collisions involving bicycles per million miles traveled at the previous 3-year average is achieved.
-Ratio

The result reported in FY 2001/2002 was 0.07. It was calculated using the Fiscal Year version of the "Traffic Activity Report" spreadsheet maintained by the DPS Records Division. Staff added the number of "Bikes No Injuries" accidents to the "Bikes With Injuries" accidents for a total of 48.

Staff then obtained the "Million-Vehicle Miles Calculation" spreadsheet from the Traffic Engineering Division of Public Works. The spreadsheet showed a total of 681.612 million miles traveled.

To calculate the result, staff divided the 48 bicycle accidents by the 681.612 million miles traveled, for a result of 0.07.

Finding #1: The result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.

Recommendation #1: The above methodology should be codified in the SOP.

Finding #2: Because the actual 3-year average is not reported as part of the result, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the goal.

Recommendation #2: The 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that it is apparent whether the goal was met.

Finding #3: Staff needs to report the number of accidents in the context of driving volume, as this measure successfully does. However, reporting the data solely in this way doesn't permit the reader to have an intuitive sense of staff performance.

Recommendation #3: To enhance the reader's understanding, the reportable results for this measure should include both the million-miles traveled statistic as well as the actual number of accidents that occurred.

Recommendation #4: As an alternative, staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled.

SDP 02 Measure #3
A ratio of collisions involving pedestrians per million miles traveled at the previous 3-year average is achieved.
-Ratio

The result reported in FY 2001/2002 was 0.05. It was calculated using the Fiscal Year version of the "Traffic Activity Report" spreadsheet from the DPS Records Division. Staff added the number of "PEDS No Injuries" accidents to "Pedestrian With Injuries" accidents. In this case, 0 + 32 = 32.

Staff then obtained the "Million Vehicle Miles Calculation" spreadsheet from the Traffic Engineering Division of Public Works. The spreadsheet showed a total of 681.612 million miles traveled.

To calculate the result, Police staff divided pedestrian accidents (32) by million miles traveled (681.612) for a result of .05.

Finding #1: The result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.

Recommendation #1: The above methodology should be codified in the SOP.

Finding #2: Because the actual 3-year average is not reported, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the 3-year average or not.

Recommendation #2: The actual 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that it is apparent whether the goal was met.

Finding #3: Staff needs to report the number of accidents in the context of the volume of miles driven, as this measure successfully does. However, reporting the data solely in this way doesn't permit the reader to have an intuitive sense of staff performance.

Recommendation #3: To enhance the reader's understanding, the reportable results for this measure should include both the million-miles traveled statistic as well as the actual number of accidents that occurred.

Recommendation #4: As an alternative, staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled.

A ratio of number of traffic collisions with injuries/fatalities per million miles traveled at the previous 3-year average is achieved.
-Ratio

The reported result for FY 2001/2002 was .58. It was calculated using the Fiscal Year version of the "Traffic Activity Report" spreadsheet from the DPS Records Division. Staff added the "Fatal Accidents/Includes Bikes and Peds" to "Injury/Includes Bikes and Peds." In this case, 1 + 399 = 400.

Staff then obtained the "Million Vehicle Miles Calculation" spreadsheet from the Traffic Engineering Division of Public Works. The spreadsheet showed a total of 681.612 million miles traveled.

To calculate the result, Police staff divided pedestrian accidents (400) by million miles traveled (681.612) for a result of .58.

Finding #1: The result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.

Recommendation #1: The above methodology should be codified in the SOP.

Finding #2: Because the actual 3-year average is not reported, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the 3-year average or not.

Recommendation #2: The actual 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that it is apparent whether the goal was met.

Finding #3: Staff needs to report the number of accidents in the context of the volume of miles driven, as this measure successfully does. However, reporting the data solely in this way doesn't permit the reader to have an intuitive sense of staff performance.

Recommendation #3: To enhance the reader's understanding, the reportable results for this measure should include both the million-miles traveled statistic as well as the actual number of accidents that occurred.

Recommendation #4: As an alternative, staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled.

SDP 02 – Measure #5
Maintaining a dollar loss per citizen due to traffic collisions at the prior 3-year average.
-Dollar Loss Per Citizen

This measure "rolls up" to Program Outcome Measure #7. See Measure #7 for findings and recommendations regarding traffic collisions. The value reported for this measure was $171.91.

SDP 02 – Measure #6
Defunct

This measure number is defunct.

SDP 02 – Measure #7
Reports of chronic unsafe traffic conditions are followed up within 7 days of receiving report 90% of the time.
-Percent of Time

The reported result for FY 2001/2002 was 95%. The result was gathered by management consulting with a traffic officer. There was no database or other tracking mechanism. The numbers are based on the officer's recollection of complaints.

Finding #1: The result reported could not be substantiated as there is no documentation for the result reported.

Finding #2: Staff has no formal mechanism to track this result.

Recommendation #1: Staff should cease reporting results for this measure until an accurate calculation method can be devised or the measure itself is revised. One alternative would be to simply report the number of unsafe traffic conditions reported to police.

Recommendation #2: Management should not use the FY 2001/2002 reported results for this measure for comparison purposes.

SDP 02 – Measure #8
All major injury/fatal traffic collisions investigated, analyzed and findings/recommendations forwarded to traffic engineering within one month of collision 90% of the time.
-Percentage of Findings/Recommendations

Police Services staff stated that the percentage reported was not the result of a calculation but was a broad estimate. The 95% reported was an estimate based on staff recollections

that there was one fatal accident that was delayed in getting to Traffic Engineering due to lengthy follow up.

Finding #1: The number reported could not be substantiated. Currently there is no tracking mechanism for the distribution of reports other than on the original hard copy. Staff indicated that it would take an unreasonable amount of time and labor to "track" reports through the current distribution process. The process would have to be substantially altered and more staff time would be required to track this measure accurately.

Finding #2: The measure does not gauge anything meaningful; it does not measure an outcome. The timeliness with which a report is forwarded to traffic engineering is an incomplete measure of police services. Service levels are not reflected by how fast findings and recommendations are forwarded to traffic engineering.

Recommendation #1: Eliminate the measure. As part of a restructure, staff may wish to consider alternative measures.

SDP 02 – Measure #9
A customer satisfaction rating of 85% for Traffic Safety Services is achieved.
-Rating

The reported result for FY 2001/2002 was 71.5%

Using summary data from the June 2002 and December 2001 Citywide surveys by the Gelfond Group, staff summed "favorable" ratings for the question "How would you rate the City of Sunnyvale on each of the following services? .... Traffic Law Enforcement." The possible answers were Very good, good, average, poor, or very poor. The summary results provided by the Gelfond Group converted these results into "Favorable, neutral, or below average." Public Safety added the "favorable" results from the June 2002 survey (68%) to the "favorable" results from the December 2001 survey (75%) and divided by 2 for the average rating of 71.5%.

Finding #1: The percentage reported was appropriately calculated by staff and substantiated by the documentation supplied to the audit team.

Section IV: Activity Findings and Recommendations

Activity 412000
Provide Police Patrol
Hours Patrolled

Products are work hours. These work hours are recorded on weekly timesheets. The FY 2002/2003 program manager stated that the total hours reported for this activity – 38,302 – probably were not accurate in FY 2001/2002 as discussed in Finding #1 below.

Finding #1: Timecards for patrol division staff customarily were filled in at the beginning of the week, prior to the work being done. The hours reported in given activities were not a reflection of actual hours worked in those activities.

Finding #2: The number reported could not be substantiated. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the 38,302 hours reported was less than half of the hours actually spent "patrolling" and on related administrative efforts.

To obtain a rough estimate of the number of hours that should have been charged to this activity, audit staff used the early data generated by the new methodology employed in late FY 2002/2003. Beginning in Accounting Period 10 of FY 2002/2003, Public Safety staff extracted from the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system the number of hours that patrol line staff were logged into the computer.

After attributing these hours to the various other patrol activities, such as responding to Emergency calls, the remaining hours were assumed to belong to the patrol activity. (For more information on this methodology, see Appendix A.) The hours attributed to this activity in Period 11 were 6,951. The same technique was used in Period 10. The hours attributed to this activity in Period 10 were 6,420. Audit staff averaged these totals and compared them to the total number of regular and overtime hours logged by patrol in those two periods. In these two periods, 67% of the total regular and overtime patrol hours logged by patrol were attributed to the "patrolling" activity.

Assuming the CAD data to be more representative of actual hours used, the audit team then applied this percentage (67%) to the estimated 120,448 total hours charged in the same activities by patrol staff in FY 2001/2002.

Sixty-seven percent of 120,448 is about 81,000. Therefore, 81,000 is a broad estimate of the number of hours that should have been charged to this activity in FY 2001/2002. This is more than double the 38,302 hours actually charged to this activity in FY 2001/2002.

This means that an estimated $2.58 million worth of personnel costs were erroneously attributed to other patrol activities in FY 2001/2002.

The implications of this are that activity costs, and therefore product costs, were artificially and substantially over-stated in other patrol activities in FY 2001/2002. See Appendix D for a table showing actual hours charged compared to estimated patrol hours spent on patrol activities.

However, it should be noted that an alternative explanation exists. It may be that officers in FY 2002/2003 failed to notify dispatch in all cases when they changed their status from "patrolling" to working on other activities. If that is the case, then the true portion of hours spent on other activities is underrepresented (and "patrol time" is over-represented) by the CAD-based methodology.

Recommendation #1: City management should not use total cost or hours spent data reported for this activity in FY 2001/2002 as a basis for future comparisons or decision making.

Recommendation #2: The SOP should be revised to reflect whatever work hours calculation methodology selected by policymakers. (See Appendix A for a discussion of two methodologies.) Staff should ensure that the new tracking mechanism is reliable and contains an audit trail. In addition, the SOP should clearly indicate how to retrieve the number of cases followed up from the CAD system. If this cannot be accomplished, staff should develop a new mechanism to track the number of cases followed up.

Activity 412020
Respond to non-Emergency Calls
A Non-Emergency Call Responded To

To report the result in FY 2001/2002, staff obtained the number of Non-Emergency Calls (Priority 3 and Priority 8) from the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Priority "3" calls are defined as "non-emergency." Priority "8" calls are animal control calls for service. Staff pulled only those Priority 8 calls that were responded to by patrol officers and added those to all Priority 3 calls. The total number of non-emergency calls reported was 44,429. The audit team determined the actual sum to be 44,441.

This total is more than double the 21,940 calls that officers originally recorded on their timecards. While the higher figure may be more accurate than what officers reported on timecards, the CAD-system methodology also is subject to inaccuracy. Although 100% of incoming calls requiring dispatch will be captured in CAD, those instances when officers are "flagged down" or are otherwise "self dispatched" may or may not be recorded in CAD, depending on whether the officer radios in. It is difficult to estimate the degree to which this circumstance occurs, but the gap is potentially significant. Dispatch management estimates the portion of "self-dispatch" calls for which no CAD record is created at 5% or less. Assuming 5% is a reasonable estimate, and assuming that there has not been an extraordinary change that would cause the actual call volume to change dramatically from one year to the next, the actual non-emergency calls for service in FY 2001/2002 could have been as high as 46,663.

Finding #1: The fact that officers appear to have failed to record as many as 24,723 calls in this one activity alone is good evidence of the FY 2002/2003 program manager's assertion that officers did not accurately report their products in FY 2001/2002.

Finding #2: Using the same methodology as described in Finding #2 of Activity 412000, there is evidence to suggest that the 34,568 work hours reported on timecards were overstated by an estimated 6,745 hours. This artificially inflated the cost of this activity by an estimated $400,000. The hours erroneously charged here should have been charged to general patrol time. Therefore, City management should assume that the hours worked, cost-per-call, and total cost for this activity were overstated in FY 2001/2002.

See Appendix D for a table showing actual hours charged compared to estimated patrol hours spent on patrol activities. Again, an alternative explanation is that CAD may not reflect all of the time that officers spent responding to non-emergency calls.

Recommendation #1: Management should not use total cost, hours spent or per-call cost data reported for this activity in FY 2001/2002 as a basis for future comparisons or decision-making.

Finding #3: The SOP for this activity defines non-emergency calls as "Priority 3, 4 or 6." Since the SOP was developed, call priorities have changed several times. (For instance, there was no "Priority 6" in use in FY 2001/2002.) Staff was unable to determine what types of calls were originally associated with the call priorities specified by the SOP. Since management lacked adequate direction for defining "non-emergency calls" for the purpose of reporting these products, Police Services decided to define "non-emergency" calls as the Patrol staff's response to "Priority 3 and 8" calls in the FY 2001/2002 labeling system. This decision was based on the belief that the call types contained in these priorities were most reasonably representative of the term "non-emergency." This definition excluded Priority 4, 5, 7 and 9. The nature of the calls contained in these priority codes is detailed below. Audit staff believes these exclusions were reasonable given the FY 2001/2002 coding structure.

For a complete list of FY 2001/2002 "Priority 3" call types, see Appendix B. The list includes trespassing, various disturbances, embezzlement and fraud, indecent exposure and prostitution, malicious mischief, prowlers, speeding, etc.

"Priority 8" calls are animal control calls. Priority 8 call types in FY 2001/2002 were:

- Animal/other
- Animal/confined
- Animal/dead
- Animal/injured or sick
- Animal/municipal code
- Park security
- Animal/public service

- Animal/quarantine/bite
- Animal/stray
- Animal/trapped
- Animal/vicious
- Animal/welfare check

Note again that this extraction included calls responded to by Patrol staff. It did not include calls handled exclusively by Animal Control staff. Other "non-emergency" call types were excluded, either because they contain codes that indicate an officer's status or activities but were not true calls for service. For instance, "Priority 5" contains officer breaks and meals, court appearances, prisoner transport, etc. Priority 9 calls were excluded because they were requests for dispatch assistance (such as running tags.)

"Priority 4" calls are traffic stop calls. They were omitted from the "non-emergency" calls count because they are captured in Activity 412230 (Provide Traffic Enforcement).

Priority 4 call types in FY 2001/2002 were :

- Backup or cover unit required
- Pedestrian stop
- Pedestrian stop with backup or cover unit
- Car stop
- Car stop with backup or cover unit

"Priority 5" call types are administrative in nature and were excluded in FY 2001/2002. These call types were:

- Sex registrant
- Arson registrant
- Pick up something
- Talk to citizen
- Talk to officer
- Narcotics registrant
- Personal time
- Booking assistance
- Be on the lookout
- Coffee break
- Meal time
- Chief's case
- Confiscated property
- Court – not available
- Errand/en route
- Evidence
- Follow up
- Prisoner transport
- Police information

- Private contract tow
- Patrol training
- Police test
- Refer to Public Works
- Refer - other
- Tear gas permit
- Tree crew required
- Vehicle service

"Priority 7" had only one call type in FY 2001/2002: abandoned vehicles. These calls were excluded from the "non-emergency" category because they are captured in the Abandoned Vehicle Abatement activity – 412430.

"Priority 9" call types in FY 2001/2002 were dispatch requests, and thus were also excluded:

- Registration and warrant check on car
- Driver's license/warrant check
- Request address of caller
- Request to make a phone call
- Criminal history request
- Phony EMS call
- Probation check
- Criminal Justice Information Center warrant check
- Records management check
- Supervised file release check
- Medical technician requested
- Tow requested
- Warrant confirmed

Recommendation #2: The SOP should be revised to list the complete call types included in each category, as opposed to listing only the "priority" numbers.

Finding #4: The nature of "urgent" calls is somewhat arbitrarily defined, and does not necessarily conform to common sense expectations. The "urgent" response category includes disparate types of calls – ranging from robberies, assaults and rapes to bomb threats, check forgeries and indecent exposure. The particular call types comprising urgent calls have changed at least three times since FY 1995/1996.

Recommendation #3: The city should examine which call types are classified as "emergency," "urgent," and "non-emergency" and consider re-classifying some calls on the basis of the maximum length of time that could be construed as an appropriate response. For instance, staff may wish to attempt to respond to a given type of call within 7 minutes or 11 minutes. The city should consider benchmarking those call types.

Recommendation #4: Call types that are substantially similar, for instance – "child steal" and "kidnapping" – should be evaluated for possible consolidation.

Recommendation #5: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412030
Respond to Urgent Calls
An Urgent Call Responded To

To report the result in FY 2001/2002, staff followed the SOP, which specifies that the result is the number of "Priority 2" calls captured in the CAD system. Priority 2 calls require an "urgent" response (defined in FY 2001/2002 as a response within 11 minutes 90% of the time, and as an average of 7 minutes) without using red lights and sirens.

The total list of Priority 2 calls included 1,971 calls. Department management then "cleaned" the data, removing ten calls believed to be invalid, for a reported result of 1,961 calls.

Priority 2 call types were:

- Suicide
- Shots Fired
- Person Called for Help
- Accident with Minor Injury
- Drunk Driving
- Alarm/Hold Up
- Alarm/Panic
- Attempted Suicide
- Shots Heard
- Missing – At Risk
- Suspicious Person With a Weapon
- Prowler in Progress
- Explosion - Patrol Response
- Stolen Vehicle in Progress
- Kidnap in Progress
- Kidnap Just Occurred
- Robbery with Injury
- Robbery in Progress
- Robbery Just Occurred
- Assault/Fire Needed
- Assault/Battery in Progress
- Assault/Battery Just Occurred
- Assault w/Deadly Weapon with Injury
- Assault w/Deadly Weapon in Progress
- Assault w/Deadly Weapon Just Occurred

- Shoot Dwelling/Car in Progress
- Shoot Dwelling/Car Just Occurred
- Rape in Progress
- Rape Just Occurred
- Child Abuse/Beating in Progress
- Child Abuse/Beating Just Occurred
- Domestic Violence with Injury
- Child Steal in Progress
- Child Steal Just Occurred
- Indecent Exposure
- Disturbance/Fight
- Disturbance/Gang Fight
- Disturbance/Unknown
- Disturbance/Weapons
- Brandish Weapon in Progress
- Burglary/Auto in Progress
- Burglary/Commercial in Progress
- Burglary/Other in Progress
- Burglary/Residential in Progress
- Burglary/School in Progress
- Check Forgery in Progress
- Grand Theft in Progress
- Illegal Entry in Progress
- Child Molestation in Progress
- Barricade
- Foot Chase
- Bomb Threat
- Hostage
- Man with a Gun
- Overdose/Ingest

Finding #1: The SOP provides inadequate direction regarding what calls are included in Priority 2, and how or when the data should be cleaned for reporting purposes.

Recommendation #1: The SOP should contain a list of call types that are included in "Priority 2." In addition, the SOP should establish clear procedures for downloading the calls and for determining what calls, if any, should be omitted from the total reported in this activity and in the corresponding program outcome measure.

Finding #2: Using the same methodology described in Activity 412000, audit staff estimates that the patrol work hours charged to this activity were overstated by about 8,300 hours. The extra hours charged here should have been charged to the general patrol time activity (412000.) See Appendix D for a breakdown of estimated charges to this and other patrol activities. This resulted in an artificially increased depiction of the cost of this activity by an estimated $500,000. An alternative explanation is that CAD may not reflect all of the time that officers spent responding to these calls.

Recommendation #2: Management should not use total cost, hours spent or per-call cost data reported for this activity in FY 2001/2002 as a basis for future comparisons or decision-making.

Recommendation #3: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412040
Respond to Emergency Calls
An Emergency Call Responded To

To report the result in FY 2001/2002, staff retrieved the number of Emergency calls - "Priority E" and "Priority 1" - from the CAD system. Emergency calls in FY 2001/2002 required a response within 7 minutes 90% of the time, and within an average of 4 minutes. "Priority E" calls are police calls that are customarily responded to with red lights and sirens. "Priority 1" calls are police calls to fire emergencies where officers respond with red lights and sirens. The SOP was outdated for FY 2001/2002, and defined Emergency calls as "Priority 1" only.

To get the total number of calls, staff began with the 244 "Priority E" calls generated as described in the Program Measure #6 section. These were Police calls to Police emergencies. Staff then extracted a list of "Priority 1" calls for service from the CAD system. These are Police calls to Fire emergencies. That list contained 1,011 calls. Staff then added the two numbers together to report a total of 1,255 emergency calls for service.

Finding #1: The number of emergency calls reported here (1,255) is substantially higher than the number of emergency calls (244) used to calculate response times in program measure #6 and SDP 41201 #3. This discrepancy occurred because at the activity level, emergency calls were taken to mean "Priority E" and "Priority 1" calls. However, at the program and SDP level, emergency calls were taken to mean only "Priority E" calls. Management stated that the discrepancy was allowed because the SOP (at the program and SDP level) only made reference to "emergency police calls for assistance." Hence, management did not include Priority 1 calls (at the program and SDP level). Taken together, the reported results and products indicate that the emergency response time reported as a program outcome is based on 1,255 calls, when in fact the response time reported applies to less than 20% of those calls.

Recommendation #1: Although the discrepancy in the number of calls used to report call volume and call response times for the same type of calls is understandable given the poor SOPs, for purposes of consistency, the same data should be used for both. The SOPs should be revised so that there is no inconsistency in the figures used for this activity and its related outcome measures.

Finding #2: Using the same methodology described in Activity 412000, the number of hours used in this activity is estimated to have been overstated by about 5,600 hours. (See Appendix D.) This overstated the cost of the activity by an estimated $338,000.

Recommendation #2: Management should not use the FY 2001/2002 reported total cost or product cost data for this activity for future comparisons or decision-making.

Recommendation #3: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412050
Provide Police Contracted OT
An Event Completed

Clerical staff responsible for scheduling the events tracked the events in an Excel spreadsheet and ensured that only one product was taken per event regardless of the number of officers working the event. Staff reported 36 events.

Finding #1: Support staff's spreadsheet shows the date of the event, the name of the event, the officers who worked the event and the number of hours worked. It should be noted that the spreadsheet shows officers worked 777 hours, but the reported hours on the MBO is 832. Therefore, it appears that 55 hours were erroneously charged to this activity.

Recommendation #1: Although this methodology conflicts with the existing SOP, which calls for officers to record products on their timecards, this method appears to be the most reliable mechanism for preventing events being left out of the final count or events being counted more than once.

Activity 412060
Provide Prisoner Transport
An Event Completed

Per the existing SOP, 2,614 products were recorded on timecards by various officers providing transport. One "event" is defined as one trip regardless of the number of prisoners transported to one destination (the Santa Clara County Jail). In an effort to enhance the accuracy of the reported products, management decided to report the number of inmates actually booked instead of relying on officers' count of the number of trips made. Staff pulled the annual booking log and counted the number of inmates. Staff inadvertently tallied bookings for only six months of the year, and the total for that time period was 1,930. This became the number of products reported. For the entire 12 months of the year, however, the booking log shows a total of 3,810 prisoners booked.

Finding #1: The final number of reported products is not reflective of a count of actual trips taken. The actual number of trips could not be determined and could be higher or lower than reported.

Recommendation #1: The SOP should be revised to establish a methodology to capture the number of trips made. The SOP should also broaden the definition of trips to include transport to all locations, such as hospitals and other detention facilities.

Recommendation #2: Management should not use reported FY 2001/2002 products reported or product cost in this activity as a basis for future comparison or decision-making.

Recommendation #3: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412250
Provide Field Admin - SLES
Work Hours

Products are work hours and were tracked on weekly timecards. There is no practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

Activity 412350
Crime Control and Order Maintenance
Work Hours

Products are work hours and were tracked on weekly timecards. There is no practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

Activity 412430
AVASA Abatement Program
A Vehicle Abated

To obtain the product count for FY 2001/2002, staff generated a list of all "Priority 7" calls from the CAD system. Priority 7 contains only abandoned vehicle calls. The documentation supplied to the audit team shows a total of 6,100 calls, which match the reported product total.

Finding #1: There is no SOP for this activity. Given that, staff's attempt to count calls for service as abated vehicles appears reasonable. However, it should be noted that calls for service are not necessarily synonymous with actual abatement activity.

Recommendation #1: Management should decide whether use of calls for service as a proxy for actual abatement activity is sufficient. An appropriate SOP that reflects the policy decision should be developed. Audit staff recommends consideration of tracking vehicles abated separately from calls for abatement service.

Finding #2: Using the methodology described in Activity 412000, audit staff estimates that some 4,400 hours were erroneously charged to this activity that should have been charged to the general patrol activity in FY 2001/2002. An alternative explanation is that CAD does not accurately reflect the amount of time officers spent on abatement. If in fact the 4,400 hours were erroneously charged here, those charges overstated the cost of this activity by an estimated $266,400. (See Appendix D.)

Recommendation #2: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412070
Provide Crime Prevention Services
A Participant Hour Completed

The SOP defines the product as the number of participant hours completed by a citizen attending juvenile, commercial, or residential crime prevention services and neighborhood safety events. In FY 2001/2002, Neighborhood Resource Officers (NROs) filled out a "Crime Prevention - Speaker Request Form" for every event they attended. The form lists the number of participants and the total hours of the presentation. The number of participants is multiplied by the number of hours to obtain the "participant hours," recorded in the bottom right corner of the sheet. After the forms are submitted, they are logged onto a weekly log sheet for each NRO. The period totals are then entered into a spreadsheet. The product reported is the sum of all participant hours reported for all 13 periods. Staff reported 71,391 participant hours completed.

The audit team randomly selected period reports from Period 2 and Period 7 to check the accuracy of the results being reported.

- The log sheets from period 2 show a total of 581 participant hours. This number does not match the 571 hours depicted on the spreadsheet used to calculate the fiscal year totals. Even though the discrepancy is minimal, the audit team also found that the speaker request forms were not properly filled out. A few request forms, which include requests for other types of presentations besides crime prevention, had the total number of participant hours but had no indication as to what activity it should be charged to. In addition, some of the weekly log sheets had no speaker names listed and only included the weekly totals.

- The log sheets from period 7 show a total of 2,472 participant hours. This number does not match the 2,489 hours shown on the spreadsheet used to calculate the fiscal year totals. Even though the discrepancy is minimal, the audit team also found that a few of the speaker request forms were not properly filled out.

Finding #1: The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were not reported accurately. Out of the two periods reviewed, the audit team found discrepancies between the number of hours listed on the weekly log sheets and the totals reported for each period. As the

calculation method currently stands, there are essentially two sources for the year-end results (the weekly log sheets and the speaker request forms).

Recommendation #1: Crime prevention staff should consider consolidating the different weekly log sheets and speaker request forms used to report fiscal year results.

Recommendation #2: Staff should consider storing the data electronically to prevent the need for manual counting and improve the accuracy of reported products.

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Activity 412080
Provide Crime Prevention Administration
Work Hours

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Products are work hours and were tracked on weekly timecards. There is no practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

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Activity 412090
Provide School Liaison
A School Visit Completed

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The 2,720 products reported were recorded on Neighborhood Resource Officer log sheets. A review of the Neighborhood Resource Officer log sheets revealed that the total products recorded on the period worksheets was higher than the totals reported on each officer's log sheet.

Finding #1: Staff reported 2,720 products on the MBO. The audit team counted 2,811 products as listed on each officer's log sheet that they should have reported. Therefore, reported products were understated relative to products recorded by officers.

Finding #2: It seems likely that the officers' reported products are higher than the actual number of school visits made. Based on the hours charged, officers reported visiting one school for every hour and 23 minutes worked. The FY 02/03 program manager indicated that officers were recording products when they visited schools and also when they undertook planning efforts associated with their pending school visits. Additionally, the SOP does not provide a mechanism for ensuring that products are not double counted.

Recommendation #1: The SOP should be revised to specify a tracking methodology that would prevent double counting of products and that would clarify what constitutes a product.

Recommendation #2: Staff should consider storing the data electronically to prevent the need for manual counting and improve the accuracy of reported products.

Activity 412100 *Provide Juvenile Probation Services-* *A Juvenile Intervention Contact Made*

The 1,747 products were reported by crime prevention staff and tracked by clerical personnel on a spreadsheet.

Finding #1: There is inadequate documentation of the products reported. The spreadsheet supplied to the audit team shows a total of 2,762 people contacted and 10,110 contacts made. The audit team has no source for the reported products.

Recommendation #1: Management should not use the reported FY 2001/2002 products or product cost as the basis for future comparisons or decision making.

Recommendation #2:   The SOP should be revised to specify a procedure for counting and documenting products. For instance, the SOP could specify what counts as an "intervention contact."

Activity 412110 *Provide Investigations Administration-* *Work Hours*

Products reported (7,836) were recorded on timecards. There is no practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

Activity 412120 *Maintain Liaison with Court, District Attorney, and City Attorney-* *Work Hours*

Products reported (474) were recorded on timecards. There is no practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

Activity 412130 *Appear in Court-* *Work Hours*

The hours reported in FY 2001/2002 were 2,265. Work hours were tracked by weekly timecards filled out by staff. Audit staff explored the possibility of using the "Court-Not Available" call type from the CAD system to identify the number of hours that should be attributed to this activity. However, this is not practical because officers often appear in court while off duty. Off-duty hours are not captured in the dispatch system. There is no

practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

Recommendation: Management may wish to consider changing the product from work hours to court cases to make the true product cost visible.

Activity 412140
Provide Patrol Follow-Up Investigation-
A Case Followed-Up

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 3,669. Staff indicated that the result reported in FY 2001/2002 came from weekly timecards.

Finding #1: There is no practical method by which audit staff could verify the products. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to their accuracy.

Finding #2: Using the methodology described in the section on Activity 412000 in this report, audit staff estimates that the work hours in this activity were overstated by about 5,150. As with the other hours estimated by this methodology, an alternative explanation is that CAD data under-represents the amount of time officers spend on this activity. If in fact the hours were erroneously charged to this activity, the value of those charges is estimated to have been about $312,000. Appendix D shows a breakdown of the estimated hours that should have been charged to this and other patrol activities, assuming CAD data more fairly represents time spent by officers.

Recommendation #1: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412150
Investigate Persons Crimes-
A Case Investigated

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 1,779. Every "person" crime or incident reported to the police is tracked manually on "cases received" worksheets by accounting period. Persons crimes are divided into six categories: murder, rape, robbery (211s), assault with deadly weapon (ADW), miscellaneous, and child abuse, and the number of reported incidents are totaled on an "Investigations Statistics" sheet every accounting period. At the end of the year, the 13 accounting period totals were added to compute the total number of persons crimes investigated.

The audit team randomly selected worksheets from Period 4, Period 9, and Period 10 to check the accuracy of the results.

Finding #1: The products reported by staff accurately reflect the total number of persons crimes reported to the police. However, whether or not a case has been "actively"

investigated, or investigated at all, cannot be determined by the documentation. In FY 2001/2002, all cases were counted as products.

Recommendation #1: Staff should only count those cases that have been investigated in the course of the fiscal year by the Investigations Bureau. The SOP should be revised to specify which cases are to be counted. Also, staff should consider revising the log sheets to make the total products easier to track, read, and count. Tracking the cases investigated with an Excel worksheet would facilitate this.

Activity 412160
Investigate Property Crime-
A Case Investigated

There were 2,227 products reported in FY 2001/2002. A case number is generated for every property crime or incident reported to the police. Property crimes were divided into four categories: fraud, grand thefts, miscellaneous, and burglaries and were recorded on the "cases received" worksheets. The totals for each category were added on an accounting period basis to compute the total number of cases investigated. The accounting period totals are reported in the "Investigations Statistics" sheet. The 13 accounting period totals were added to compute the annual number of property cases investigated. The total for FY 2001/2002 appears in the period 13 "Investigations Statistics" sheet under the "Year to Date Totals."

The audit team randomly selected the results reported in Period 1, Period 3, and Period 9 to check the accuracy of the products reported.

Finding #1: The products reported accurately reflect the total number of property crimes reported to the police. However, whether or not a case is being "actively" investigated, or investigated at all, cannot be determined by the documentation. In FY 2001/2002, all cases were counted as products.

Recommendation #1: Staff should only count those cases that have been investigated in the course of the fiscal year by the Investigations Bureau. The SOP should be revised to specify which cases are to be counted. Staff should decide which specific cases should be counted for this measure and specify the criteria in the SOP. Also, staff should consider revising the log sheets to make the total products easier to track, read, and count. Tracking the cases investigated with an Excel worksheet would facilitate this.

Activity 412170
Conduct Vice/Narcotics Investigations-
A Case Investigated

There were 282 products reported in FY 2001/2002. Staff stated that the number of narcotics/vice cases investigated was reported through "Activity Log Sheets" that are filled out by Lieutenants and maintained by the Senior Office Assistant.

Finding #1: The total products reported in FY 2001/2002 was inaccurate. The documentation supplied to the audit team was an "Investigations Statistics" sheet from all Periods in FY 2001/2002 listing a total of 282 under Activity 412170. The "Activity Log Sheets," however, show a total of 223 apparent investigations.

Finding #2: The SOP is unclear as to what counts as a narcotics/vice case investigated. The categories on the "Activity Log Sheet" provide some indication, but the SOP should specifically state when a case should be entered into the log sheet.

Recommendation #1: The SOP should be revised so that it gives a clear indication as to what counts as a case investigated. In addition, the calculation method in the SOP should make reference to the "Activity Log Sheet."

Recommendation #2: If possible, staff should consider tracking the products electronically. This would save staff time and might make the products reported more accurate.

Activity 412180
Collect and Process Physical Evidence-
A Case Investigated

The result reported in FY 2001/2002 was 6,933 cases. Staff indicated that the number reported reflects a product count through timecards.

Finding #1: The number reported could not be substantiated by the audit team. There was no documentation available for the 6,933 cases investigated. The SOP does not require documentation beyond the timecard itself.

Finding #2: The SOP is unclear as to what counts as a case investigated.

Recommendation #1: The SOP should be revised so that it gives a clear indication as to what counts as a case investigated. In addition, staff should keep a listing of all the cases investigated with the name of the investigator, date of incident, case number, and status of investigation.

Finding #3: This activity has several sub-activities with incompatible products. For example, one of the sub-activities measures "physical evidence" that is processed (412182). However, the SOP for the activity states that "a product is one case investigated."

Recommendation #2: The activity should be restructured so that the sub-activity products, if they are needed at all, "roll-up" into a total number of cases investigated. Alternatively, the subactivities could be eliminated.

Recommendation #3: Management should not use the FY 2001/2002 products reported for decision making or comparison in the future. Until the sub-activities problem is resolved, no products should be reported for this activity.

Activity 412240
Conduct Crime Analysis-
Reports

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 384. Staff produced a variety of different types of reports dealing with crime. The number of reports produced was reported to the Senior Office Assistant on an accounting period basis. The product total reported in FY 2001/2002 is the sum of the reports produced during all 13 accounting periods. Note that the documentation provided to the audit team was only the total number of reports for each accounting period.

Finding #1: The products reported could not be substantiated by the audit team. There is no documentation available describing the substance, type, dates, or authors of the 384 reports. The SOP indicates that staff is supposed to count "Crime Analysis Reports," but this is not defined. This could be construed to include or exclude a broad range of reports and analysis.

Recommendation #1: The SOP should be revised so that it requires staff to track the number of reports as well as the report names and dates on a log sheet. A log sheet would provide a more comprehensive reference as to the number of Crime Analysis reports produced. The SOP should also clearly state what type of reports count as products for this measure.

Activity 412370
Criminal Investigation-
Work Hours

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 277. Work hours were tracked by weekly timecards filled out by Investigations staff. This activity was defunct as of FY 2002/2003.

Activity 412190
Provide Traffic Administration-
Work Hours

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 2,014. Work hours were tracked by weekly timecards filled out by Traffic staff. There is no practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

Activity 412200
Provide Traffic Safety Education
Participant Hour Completed

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 31. Officers estimated the number of participant hours on their timecards.

Finding #1: The FY 2001/2002 result was recorded per the existing SOP. However, due to the nature of the calculation methodology, the reported result cannot be substantiated because there is no supporting documentation available that shows how many events and how many participant hours per event were completed. The SOP states that "the officer in charge of providing the service counts the total number of participants completing the event and multiplies that number by the amount of time it takes to complete the event."

Recommendation #1: The calculation method in the SOP should be revised to require development of a log listing the event, the number of participants and the time spent to enable documentation of the result reported.

Activity 412210
Conduct Collisions Investigations
A Collision Investigated

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 1,681. This number is the total number of accidents reported to police as depicted on the "Traffic Activity Report." Staff assumed that all collisions reported were investigated.

Finding #1: The products reported accurately reflect the total number of collisions reported to the police. However, whether or not a case was "actively" investigated cannot be determined by the documentation. In FY 2001/2002, all collisions were counted as products.

Recommendation #1: Police staff should revise the SOP so that the calculation method distinguishes between collisions reported and collisions investigated. The SOP should contain a clear indication as to what counts as a collision investigated and how such investigations should be tracked. Whether this involves writing a report or closing a case incident on the CAD system, the SOP should explicitly states what counts as a case investigated.

Finding #2: Using the methodology as described in the section on Activity 412000, audit staff estimates that about 1,000 hours were charged to this activity in FY 2001/2002 that should have been charged to the general patrol activity. However, an alternative explanation is that CAD data is not capturing all of the officer time that is spent in this activity. If in fact hours were erroneously charged to this activity, the estimated value of those hours is approximately $62,000. (See Appendix D for a breakdown of hours

estimated to have been charged to patrol activities in FY 2001/2002 using the CAD methodology.)

Recommendation #2: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412220
Provide Traffic Control/Direction
A Location Patrolled

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 6,697. Management was not sure how the products reported in FY 2001/2002 were calculated. Products probably came from officer timecards, as per the SOP.

Finding #1: The products reported could not be substantiated by the audit team. The basis of the reported products is unknown. The SOP is unclear as it defines the product as "one location where traffic control is conducted <u>or</u> one crossing guard post day patrolled each day."

Recommendation #1: The SOP should be re-written with specific instructions indicating how the products should be defined, tracked and reported.

Recommendation #2: Management should not use FY 2001/2002 reported products or product cost for future comparison or decision-making. Until an appropriate tracking methodology is in place per Recommendation #1, products reported for this activity should be listed as "Not Available."

Activity 412230
Provide Traffic Enforcement
A Traffic Stop Made

In FY 2001/2002, officers originally recorded 34,632 traffic stops on their timecards. Management believed that multiple officers responding to the same traffic stop were each logging a product on their timecards. Therefore, one traffic stop might be recorded several times. Management believed that using the CAD system would yield a more accurate product count. Using CAD system data for traffic stops (priority 4), staff then reported 12,284 products in FY 2001/2002.

Finding #1: The revised result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.

Recommendation #1: Edit the calculation methodology in the SOP to state that the products are taken from the CAD system. Specifically, staff should count the total number of the following call types (Priority 4 calls):

- Backup or cover unit required
- Pedestrian stop
- Pedestrian stop with backup or cover unit
- Car stop
- Car stop with backup or cover unit

Finding #2: Using the methodology described in the section on Activity 412000, audit staff estimates that about 11,450 patrol time work hours were erroneously charged to this activity in FY 2001/2002 that should have been charged to the general patrol activity. This amounts to an estimated $692,600 worth of work hours. However, an alternative explanation is that patrol time spent on this activity is not being captured in the CAD system.

Recommendation #2: See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.

Activity 412380
Traffic Safety
Work Hours

The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were 5,035 work hours. The number reported came from timecards. There is no practical method by which audit staff could attempt to verify hours charged. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to the accuracy of these hours.

Section V: Recommendations Regarding Matters Exceeding the Audit Scope

The primary purpose of this audit was to review and report on the accuracy of outcome and product data for the 2001/2002 fiscal year. This report has presented a number of findings and recommendations related to these matters. In the course of conducting this review, audit staff also identified issues that may merit further exploration by management but that exceeded the scope of this audit. These issues include:

- Whether to standardize reporting methodologies at a policy level, and if so, how to evaluate which reporting methodologies are best.

- Whether to standardize at a policy level the type of calls contained in each response priority.

- Whether to establish a citywide policy that no activity or measure be implemented without first developing and testing highly detailed, written procedures.

- Whether the volume and complexity of proposed new measures for the Department of Public Safety should be re-examined and/or scaled back to ensure that those measures are sufficiently focused and feasible for implementation. (See Appendix F for a listing of the 20 measures suggested for patrol and investigations in Kansas City. Other organizations such as the International City Management Association also have suggested measures of police performance.)

- Whether to report the budget/cost ratio measure at the department level instead of at the program level in order to eliminate the artificial inflation of the measure's index score as described in Appendix E.

Section VI: Conclusion

Program Outcome and Service Delivery Plan Measures:

It appears that the central problems with reported results for Program outcome and service delivery plan measures can be resolved by revamping the measures themselves, improving procedures for calculating results and enhancing record keeping of data used to calculate results. The measures themselves should be revised so that they are: a) meaningful, b) calculable, c) useful to police staff, and d) not a burden to calculate. Unless the measures are improved, audit staff believes that many of the problems will continue.

Activities:

The most difficult challenges exist at the activity level. In general, products claimed have been inaccurate, poorly calculated or unsubstantiated. In some cases, it appears that work hours have been attributed to the wrong activities. Significant, permanent improvements will require a long-term commitment to making the accuracy of data a priority. Extensive changes designed to eliminate many of the problems have been implemented. However, many of these methods have drawbacks, as well, and the full implications of these changes remain to be determined. Furthermore, the sustainability of these efforts is in question given the City's budget cuts, the level of expertise required to obtain the data necessary to continue the new methodologies, and the department's tendency to frequently reorganize and turn over staff and management.

Section VII: Appendices

Appendix A: *Discussion of FY 2001/2002 vs. FY 2002/2003 Reporting Methodologies for Select Activities*

Citywide Practices

For many years, employees' work hours, associated personnel costs, and many of the products of their work, have been attributed to particular activities through timecards. Below is a hypothetical timecard under the system that was in place for all employees in FY 2001/2002. This example is for a patrol officer who worked 40 hours of straight time and 7 hours of overtime on a Saturday through Tuesday schedule.

Hypothetical Weekly Timecard for Officer Jones										
(Prior to FY 2002/2003)										
Activity Name	Work Hours		Products	M	Tu	W	Th	F	Sa	Su
	Overtime	Straight								
Emergency Calls	1	1.75	12	0.5	1				1	0.25
Urgent Calls	0	4	18	0.5	0.5				2	1
Non-Emergency Calls	2	2	24	1	0.5				2	0.5
Provide Patrol	4	32.25	36.25	9	10				8	9.25
Total	7	40	NA	11	12	0	0	0	13	11

Timecards are filled in by the employee, signed by a manager, and turned in to Payroll once a week. The data is manually entered into the Financial system by Finance staff. This data is then used to generate paychecks and the product count and cost data as depicted on reports such as the MBO report.

In theory, at least, this procedure elegantly captures every hour that every employee is paid for and, by estimation, attributes that time and the expense for it to a particular effort for which the City has appropriated funds. It also enables those employees who complete products to account for them, while completing paperwork that would have to be done anyway. Under this system, all hours and actual costs are accounted for and attributed to a specific task. Products are recorded by the individuals who actually produced them. In theory, no administrative person has to track or record anything and the actual estimated cost of completing a given task and the actual result is captured. In this regard, the system has a very low cost and is extremely easy to administer. Properly administered, this system encourages responsibility and productivity in that every employee must at the end of the week personally account for what time he or she has worked and what he or she has to show for it in terms of products.

Elegant though it is, this system creates several problems when used in the "real world." For one thing, recording products this way produces no documentation that those products were in fact completed and there is no practical way to determine after the fact how the timecard author defined or counted the products.

Another problem with this methodology is that it is prone to error. A common type of error is attributing time worked to the incorrect activity. For simplicity, the example above shows activities by their name, but in practice the activities are coded on timecards by their six-digit number. Therefore, typographical errors made by either the employee or the data entry clerk may erroneously attribute time to an incorrect activity. Additionally, many activity names are similar, and employees may be unaware of the intended differences between the various activities. Two employees may attribute the same efforts to different activities. The same is true of product counts. Employees may misinterpret the definition of a product and therefore list too many or too few on their timecards. They may also be unaware that another employee has already recorded a product (such as a traffic collision investigation) on a timecard, so that product may be inadvertently captured twice. Conversely, an employee may assume that someone else has already reported the product when in fact no one has recorded it. Although program managers are tasked with reviewing reports to correct such errors, it can be difficult and time consuming to determine whether such errors have occurred and what the correct product count should be.

Police Services Practices

In addition to the issues listed above that all programs are subject to, Police Services appears to have had particular difficulty making the timecard system work for them. This program had numerous "subactivities" that staff was expected to track. In interviews, management indicated that officers strongly dislike the timecard system. Management indicated that lieutenant hours were being charged to set activities regardless of where time was actually spent.

It is apparent that the nature of many Police Services activities makes them especially vulnerable to the error of multiple employees noting the same products on their timecards. For instance, several officers may respond to one call, and each officer may record a product without realizing that all the other respondents also have recorded the same call as a product.

Further, Police Service personnel have indicated that officers have difficulty tracking their time given how their workdays are broken up. For example, an officer may handle an emergency call for 12 minutes, then be dispatched to an urgent call where he spends 18 minutes, and then he patrols for 2 hours and 20 minutes. After that, he may work a non-emergency call for 35 minutes, and then handle a traffic stop. At the end of the day, the officer may understandably have difficulty accurately estimating the number of calls he handled, what the accounting code is for that call, and the amount of time he spent on each one. As described in more detail later in this section, however, officers have the ability to obtain a printout of all the time they have logged into the CAD system each day.

All of these problems played a role in the inaccuracy of reported work hours and products in FY 2001/2002 in Police Services. In an effort to address these problems, Police Services management implemented in FY 2002/2003 the alternative system as described

below. These new procedures were put in place at various times throughout the 2002/2003 fiscal year – virtually paralleling this audit – and therefore have not been reviewed by the audit team. These new procedures are a departure from previous Citywide and department practices and SOPs.

This section is presented because this audit report recommends that management review the new procedures and actively decide – based on the tradeoffs between the new procedures, the timecard system, and whatever other alternatives may exist – a policy on Police Services processes. It is not possible to have a system that is inexpensive, highly sustainable and entirely free of error. Tradeoffs must be made. <u>More importantly, it is clear that, due to the size and complexity of the program, the method for tracking and recording work time and products plays a large role in what the actual results will be at the end of a year. It is not possible to change methodology without altering the actual reported results.</u>

Police Services New Processes - FY 2002/2003

Management proactively has attempted to solve many of the issues regarding the accuracy of hours and products as reported through the timecard system by implementing a series of relatively complex alternatives. Although some data in FY 20002/2003 was still being captured on timecards, much of the data collection was being handled by administrative personnel with a high degree of management oversight.

<u>Patrol work hours and products</u>

The first problem management attempted to solve was the issue of patrol division staff attributing their work hours to the wrong activities and recording too many or too few products. The new procedure works as follows:

- Officers record in a "dummy activity" all the time (regular and overtime) spent on nine patrol duties: patrolling, responding to emergency calls, responding to non-emergency calls, responding to urgent calls, transporting prisoners, following up on patrol investigations, investigating traffic collisions, providing traffic stops and abating abandoned vehicles. They record no products on their timecards.

- Police Department administrative staff with a high degree of specialized expertise extracts, interprets, and "cleans" data from the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system to determine how much time patrol officers spent on various call types and priorities for each accounting period. This data is then converted from police codes to the above activities, except for the activity for patrolling. For instance, Priority E calls are attributed to the "Respond to Emergency Calls" activity. Then police staff takes the total number of hours shown in the "dummy activity" and attributes it proportionally to the various activities (except patrolling) based on the CAD data. After all of the allocations to activities are finished, the time "left over" is assumed to belong to the patrol activity and is attributed there.

Below is a reproduction of the actual allocation worksheet used in Period 11 of FY 2002/2003:

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY			
POLICE SERVICES DIVISION			
FY 2002-03 Record of Regular/Overtime Hours			
ACCOUNTING PERIOD:	11		
PROGRAM:	412		
WORK GROUP:	Patrol Line Staff		
AS SUBMITTED ON TIMECARDS:			
Task #	*Finance Total Hours*	*Adjustment/ Addt'l Hrs*	*%*
412920 (Dummy Activity)	9857.20	n/a	100.00%
ADJUSTED HERETO:			
Task #	*Dispatch Total Hours*	*Adjustment/ Addt'l Hrs*	*%*
412000 (Provide Patrol)	1400.69	5551.03	70.52%
412020 (Respond to Non-Emergency Calls)	2212.63	n/a	22.45%
412030 (Respond to Urgent Calls)	259.20	n/a	2.63%
412040 (Respond to Emergency Calls)	84.93	n/a	0.86%
412060 (Provide Prisoner Transport)	195.05	n/a	1.98%
412140 (Patrol Follow Up Investigations)	38.69	n/a	0.39%
412210 (Collision Investigations)	22.69	(AP 11 = 116.22; reduced by 93.53 to correct AP 10 erroneous figure)	0.23%
412230 (Traffic Enforcement)	91.60	(AP 11 = 278.66; reduced by 187.06 to correct AP 10 erroneous figure)	0.93%
412430 (AVASA Abatement)	0.69	n/a	0.01%
Adjusted Hours:	4306.17	n/a	43.69%
		5551.03	100.00%

Except for the products for transporting prisoners, which are tracked separately by administrative staff, the products for all of the above activities are also extracted from CAD.

The primary benefit of this approach is that the accuracy of both hours and products attributed to activities is probably better than using timecards to capture this information. However, the information in CAD is not generated by CAD itself, but by its users. Therefore, that data as well is subject to human error.

Another benefit is that it prevents officers from having to "sort out" their workdays on the basis of how many minutes or hours they spent on what sort of effort. For a patrol officer, this sorting can be challenging because time spent on any given activity may be divided into small pieces and scattered throughout the day. An officer's day might involve only a handful of different activities, but the time in those activities may be divided into many different segments.

Despite these benefits, there are some drawbacks to this methodology.

First, it breaks the link between hours spent and dollars spent at the activity level. Although the total dollars spent in the program will be represented precisely, the dollars at the activity level will only be an approximation of the actual cost of carrying out that task. Imagine, for instance, two activities that consume exactly the same number of hours in a year. Imagine that one activity is done entirely by individuals whose time costs the City $60 an hour, and the another activity is done entirely by staff whose time costs the City $75 an hour. Although the actual cost of the first activity is cheaper than that of the second activity, the cost as depicted on the City's reports will be identical. The following three tables illustrate this change.

The first table illustrates the "old methodology" by way of three hypothetical activities (ABC, XYZ and LMN.) For simplicity, this example assumes an equal amount of work time spent on each activity in a given year by each of three patrol staff members. In this example, a PSO II paid at the highest rate (plus benefits) worked 800 hours in Activity ABC. Another PSO II paid at the lowest rate worked 800 hours in Activity XYZ. A Lieutenant at the highest rate worked 800 overtime hours in Activity LMN. Assuming these people charge their time to the correct activities, the actual cost for carrying out each activity ranges from $48,400 to $60,384, and the total cost for all three is $149,904.

Table 1:	Old Methodology			
Title	Activity	Hours Charged	Loaded Hourly Rate	Cost
PSO II (highest rate)	ABC	800	$ 60.5	$ 48,400
PSO II (lowest rate)	XYZ	800	$ 51.4	$ 41,120
Lt. (highest OT rate)	LMN	800	$ 75.5	$ 60,384
Total		2,400		$ 149,904

The table below depicts this hypothetical example in the new, CAD-based methodology. In this example, the same 2,400 hours are charged to a "dummy" activity. Data is extracted from CAD depicting the percent of time actually spent on each effort. In this case 1/3 of the total 2,400 hours were spent on each activity. Therefore, 800 hours and 1/3 of the total cost of $149,904 are attributed to each activity.

Table 2:		New Methodology		
Activity	Hours Charged	Total Cost	Percent of Total Time Spent on Each Activity Per CAD	Costs Attributed to Activities
ABC	0		33.33%	$ 49,968
XYZ	0		33.33%	$ 49,968
LMN	0		33.33%	$ 49,968
"Dummy"	2,400	$ 149,904	0.00%	$ 0
Total	2,400	$ 149,904	100.00%	$ 149,904

As the example shows, the total cost and the total number of hours is the same in each method. However, the apparent cost of each activity varies depending on the method used. The following table depicts the difference in the apparent cost of each activity (and thus product cost) by method employed.

Table 3: Impact of Methodology Change on Activity Costs			
Activity	Actual Cost (Old Method)	Attributed Cost (New Method)	Difference
ABC	$ 48,400	$ 49,968	$ 1,568
XYZ	$ 41,120	$ 49,968	$ 8,848
LMN	$ 60,384	$ 49,968	$ (10,416)
Total	$ 149,904	$ 149,904	$ 0

At the end of the year, Activity LMN appears to cost $10,416 less than it actually did. Activity XYZ appears to cost $8,848 more than it actually did.

Note however that, as indicated earlier, this example is predicated on the assumption that all three individuals charged their time to the correct activities in the "old methodology." If in fact they charged their time erroneously, and those erroneous charges were in effect corrected by the "new methodology," the costs depicted in the "new methodology" table could be much closer to the true cost of those activities.

As an example of how the new methodology may be more accurate, imagine that the officer who spent 800 hours on activity ABC inadvertently charged only 200 hours to that

activity. Imagine that the other 600 hours were erroneously charged to a completely unrelated activity – Activity 123.

Under the old methodology, the cost for the activity where the work was done would appear as $60.50 x 200 = $12,100. The *true cost* of doing the activity is still $60.50 x 800 = $48,400. Under the new methodology, the cost would appear as 1/3rd of the total of the three activities, or $49,968. In this scenario, the amount attributed to the activity under the new methodology is much closer to the true cost. This scenario is illustrated in Table 4 below.

Table 4	Officer Jones at an Hourly Rate of $60.50					
	True Time and Dollars Spent		Time and Dollars Depicted by Old (Timecard) Method		Time and Dollars Depicted by New (CAD) Method	
	True hours spent	True cost	Hours as logged	Apparent cost	Hours attributed (1/3 of 2,400 total hours charged to ABC, XYZ and LMN)	Apparent cost (1/3 of $149,904 total cost of activities ABC, XYZ, LMN)
Activity ABC	800	$ 48,400	200*	$ 12,100	800	$ 49,968

*600 hours erroneously logged to Activity 123

Despite the potential for increased accuracy by eliminating erroneous logging of time, the new method is subject to errors as well:

- CAD only captures the time as officers themselves report into the system. It does not capture time that officers fail to radio in to dispatchers. As indicated earlier in this report, Dispatch estimates this gap to be about 5% of all patrol officer time, but the amount could be higher or lower. Calls may not be opened and closed precisely. This means that the amount of time CAD indicates was spent on the various efforts may be inaccurate.

- The data is subject to error in the process of manipulation, as the extraction process is complex and requires specialized expertise.

- Officers may still record too much or too little time to the "dummy" activity relative to other activities that are not part of the allocation process. For instance, officers who spent time in court in a given week could erroneously record all time worked for the week to the dummy activity.

Third, this process is more expensive. Administrative staff in Public Safety must spend time extracting and manipulating data. Management must also complete additional paperwork indicating where dollars and hours and products are to be attributed and Finance staff must then process it.

Fourth, this process may not be sustainable over the long term. The original FY 2003/2004 budget reduction submittal by Public Safety proposed to eliminate the position currently responsible for extracting and manipulating the data used to calculate these allocations. Due to the high level of expertise required, turnover/retirement of key staff can impair the reporting process. A potential solution to that problem is the availability of daily printouts for each officer of all time logged into the CAD system. If each officer used the printouts as a basis for completing timecards, the CAD-based process would not be vulnerable to staff changes. Police Services management has indicated that this solution is not practical, but the audit team recommends that it be explored further before being dismissed as an option.

Lastly, the initial implementation of this procedure resulted in errors in product counts in Accounting Period reports in FY 2002/2003. Although year-to-date totals through Accounting Period 11 were accurate to the best of management's knowledge, the period totals were manipulated to compensate for erroneous product charges in prior periods in order to achieve the correct year-to-date totals.

The following table presents a few examples:

Activity	Actual Period 11 products	Period 11 reported products
Respond to Emergency Calls (412040)	86	74
Provide Prisoner Transport (412060)	133	217
AVASA Abatement (412430)	255	208

Presumably, this problem would be resolved over time as the word "gets out" about the new procedure.

Non-Patrol Work Hours and Products

In the rest of the program's activities, hours are still being recorded by individuals on timecards. For instance, patrol officers are still recording time spent in court to the court activity (412130) on their timecards. Detectives, managers and administrative staff continue to record their time on timecards or other forms as usual.

As indicated earlier, products in the non-patrol activities often are captured by administrative staff, and sometimes officers, filling out forms other than timecards. The data on these various forms is then transferred to an internal document that management calls the "consolidated report." The program manager then transfers this data to Finance staff, who enter it into the Financial system.

There are at least two advantages of using this process from the perspective of Police Services.

First, administrative staff can, at least theoretically, prevent some double counting or undercounting of products. For example, the administrative person who books the event for contracted overtime records just one product for each event on the consolidated report, preventing the duplicate counting that could occur if each officer who worked the event recorded the product on each of their timecards.

Secondly, this process leaves better documentation of how products are counted and recorded. For instance, rather than there being no documentation at all when an officer working a contracted overtime event records a product on a timecard, the administrative staff that booked the event records the name and date of the event and which officers provided security.

There are disadvantages to this procedure as well. First, it is more expensive for administrative staff to take on what amounts to "timecard completion" duties, and it creates additional forms that must be completed and maintained. Sustainability of this effort is also in question, as it requires a high degree of involvement by the program manager, who must continuously monitor and correct reports to ensure that products are not being recorded on timecards but rather through the "consolidated reports." It also requires the ongoing presence of administrative staff to complete the reports. The table that follows summarizes the key benefits and drawbacks of the "timecard" versus "administrative" systems.

Timecards		Administrative Processes	
Benefits	*Drawbacks*	*Benefits*	*Drawbacks*
Must be completed regardless; Data capture is cheap and efficient and requires no additional administrative staff time.	Products tend to be inaccurate; work hours tend to be attributed to the wrong activities; there's no documentation of products.	Accuracy of both products and time attribution is probably better; documentation may be better.	Not all time can be captured administratively – time will still have to be attributed by most staff through timecards; Significant errors may still occur; it's more expensive and requires the time and expertise of administrative staff and management.
May encourage productivity/ accountability by enabling workers to clearly see their productivity each week.	Patrol officers strongly dislike the timecard system.	Patrol officers likely to prefer this system; probably enhances morale and relationship with management.	Patrol officers no longer clearly see their productivity each week; administrative staff may not like the system; many efforts must still be captured through timecards; costs are not precise at the activity level.
Process is sustainable regardless of the level and amount of turnover; no special training or expertise is required to capture data; accuracy is everyone's responsibility.	In practice, there has been little oversight of data and much of it is inaccurate.	Process provides additional administrative oversight.	Accuracy is the responsibility of a few people; process is highly dependent on the efforts and expertise of a handful of staff and is therefore subject to abandonment as a result of turnover/budget cuts.
One form that must be filled in anyway captures everything.	Management has tended to add sub-activities that make the forms more difficult to complete accurately.	Officers record fewer products and attribute less time to activities since this data is tracked administratively.	Staff must complete numerous forms, as well as timecards; not all activities are tracked administratively.

Appendix B: *Complete FY 2001/2002 List of "Priority 3" (Non-Emergency) Call Types*

- Resisting Arrest
- Homicide
- Kidnapping Report
- Robbery Report
- Assault/Battery Report
- Assault with a Deadly Weapon Report
- Shooting at a dwelling or car
- Rape report
- Child steal report
- Indecent exposure
- Disturbance/other
- Brandish weapon report
- Check forgery report
- Petty theft report
- Grand theft report
- Possession of Stolen Property
- Embezzlement
- Defrauding an Innkeeper
- Malicious mischief report
- Trespassing
- Illegal entry
- Child molestation
- 911 disconnect
- Report on conditions
- Open door
- Open window
- Coroners case
- Garbage complaint
- Missing persons report
- Suspicious person
- Prowler report
- Traffic hazard
- Abandon Bike
- Suspicious vehicle
- Accident/property damage
- Traffic control
- Forged prescription
- Insane person
- Stolen vehicle report
- Auto tampering report
- Illegal weapon

- Domestic violence
- Suspended license
- Hit and Run/felony
- Hit and Run/misdemeanor
- Speeding vehicle
- Tow needed
- Reckless driving
- Speeding contest
- Alarm/vehicle
- Alarm/commercial
- Alarm/residence
- Alarm/school
- Suspicious package
- Stolen vehicle (just occurred)
- Noises
- Patrol responding with Fire Services to explosion
- Recovered stolen vehicle
- Animal/noisy
- Hit and run/misdemeanor (just occurred)
- Child abuse/beating
- Child neglect/custody
- Minor with cigarette
- Disturbance/argument
- Disturbance/family
- Disturbance/juvenile
- Disturbance/music
- Disturbance/noise ordinance
- Disturbance/party
- Disturbance/power equipment
- Brandish weapon (just occurred)
- Arson report
- Burglary/auto report
- Burglary/auto (just occurred)
- Burglary/commercial report
- Burglary/commercial (just occurred)
- Burglary/other
- Burglary/other (just occurred)
- Burglary/residential report
- Burglary/residential (just occurred)
- Check forgery (just occurred)
- Insufficient funds
- Credit card forgery
- Petty theft (just occurred)
- Grand theft (just occurred)
- Shoplifter in custody
- Joyriding

- Malicious mischief in progress
- Malicious mischief (just occurred)
- Uncontrolled juvenile
- Child molestation (just occurred)
- Prostitution
- Drunk in public
- Annoying phone call
- 911 abandoned
- ATT to contact
- Bar check
- Business/Professions code violation
- Concealed weapon
- Lost/stolen checks
- Property damage
- Civil problem
- Stakeout
- Civil standby
- Something occurring on school property
- Escort
- Found adult
- Flagged down
- Found juvenile
- Found property
- Fraud/counterfeit
- Fireworks
- Gambling
- Gang related report
- Hazardous condition
- Health & Safety violation (usually drug violations)
- Hunting/levees
- Injury accident
- Injury – city property
- Invalid assist
- Lewd/lascivious
- Locked in/out
- Lost property
- Municipal code violation
- Not otherwise classified
- Other code violation
- Outside service
- Panhandler
- Penal code violation
- Parker
- Public service
- Repossession
- Special assignment

- Subpoena service
- Security check
- Search warrant
- Signal problem
- Solicitor
- Stalking
- Suspicious circumstances
- Truancy
- Unknown circumstance
- Vagrant
- Vehicle code violation
- Vice
- Violation/order
- Walkaway report
- Welfare check
- Welfare/Institution code violation
- Warrant service

Appendix C: *Comparison of Actual vs. Hypothetical Results for Program Measure #1*

Actual Data: Part I Crime Rates Per 100,000 Population

NATIONAL

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	7YR
MURDER	9.0	8.2	7.4	6.8	6.3	5.7	5.5	489.0
RAPE	39.3	37.1	36.3	35.9	34.5	32.8	32.0	2479.0
ROBBERY	237.8	220.9	201.9	186.2	165.5	150.1	144.9	10458.4
AGGR. ASSAULT	427.6	418.3	391	382.1	361.4	334.3	323.6	18468.2
BURG	1042.1	987	945	918.8	863.2	769.4	728.4	31269.6
AUTO	591.3	560.3	525.7	505.7	459.9	422.5	414.2	6959.1
THEFT	3026.9	3043.2	2980.3	2891.8	2729.5	2550.7	2475.3	19697.7
WEIGHTED AVERAGE								2088.9

CALIFORNIA

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	7YR
MURDER	11.5	11.0	9.0	7.8	6.5	5.9	6.1	577.7
RAPE	34.1	32.9	31.6	30.9	29.2	27.7	28.9	2153.3
ROBBERY	348.9	326.2	290.7	247.0	205.3	176.4	177.9	14178.7
AGGR. ASSAULT	597.8	581.2	516.9	495.3	445.1	400.7	408.7	24119.9
BURG	1196.0	1103.5	962.8	906.9	802.7	657.6	656.3	31429.0
AUTO	959.3	874.3	747.9	693.4	583.4	495.0	537.4	9781.3
THEFT	2888.9	2812.7	2559.5	2378.1	2160.8	1944.0	1924.5	16668.4
WEIGHTED AVERAGE								2300.2

SC COUNTY

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	7YR
MURDER	3.5	3.5	2.9	3.7	2.6	2.2	2.0	204.0
RAPE	35.3	35.5	33.2	32.2	31.6	28.8	28.5	2251.0
ROBBERY	117.3	124.7	108.3	86.0	83.8	66.3	61.7	5184.8
AGGR. ASSAULT	411.5	442.3	402.8	434.8	356.8	336.2	330.5	19004.4
BURG	684.8	637.7	544.8	524.3	459.7	336.0	348.8	17680.5
AUTO	442.6	407.7	348.6	351.7	286.8	258.6	235.9	4663.7
THEFT	2601.9	2506.0	2448.0	2188.3	2044.9	1780.0	1594.9	15164.0
WEIGHTED AVERAGE								1491.9

SUNNYVALE

	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	7YR
MURDER	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	0.8	45.7
RAPE	22.4	21.6	17.5	19.6	19.5	10.5	13.1	1241.7
ROBBERY	80.0	54.1	57.2	38.4	35.3	35.3	33.0	2666.8
AGGR. ASSAULT	100.8	83.5	82.4	85.0	111.9	74.3	99.9	4464.7
BURG	357.6	302.2	391.3	221.2	229.7	211.7	236.7	9752.1
AUTO	284.0	198.6	239.5	150.5	147.9	153.9	143.7	2636.2
THEFT	1324.8	1813.8	1761.3	1501.9	1477.3	1342.0	1500.2	10721.3
WEIGHTED AVERAGE								733.2

RESULTS

	Sunnyvale	Result	
National	2088.9	733.2	64.90%
State	2300.2	733.2	68.12%
County	1491.9	733.2	50.85%

Hypothetical Data: Effect of Tripling of Sunnyvale Part I Crime Rates for FY 01/02

SUNNYVALE								
	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	7YR
MURDER	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	2.3	61.1
RAPE	22.4	21.6	17.5	19.6	19.5	10.5	39.2	1503.0
ROBBERY	80.0	54.1	57.2	38.4	35.3	35.3	99.1	3195.5
AG-ASS	100.8	83.5	82.4	85.0	111.9	74.3	299.7	5863.4
BURG	357.6	302.2	391.3	221.2	229.7	211.7	710.1	12119.2
AUTO	284.0	198.6	239.5	150.5	147.9	153.9	431.2	3211.1
THEFT	1324.8	1813.8	1761.3	1501.9	1477.3	1342.0	4500.6	13721.7
WEIGHTED AVERAGE								922.7

RESULTS

		Sunnyvale	Result
National	2088.9	922.7	55.83%
State	2300.2	922.7	59.89%
County	1491.9	922.7	38.15%

Comparison of Budgeted (Goal) Results, Actual Results and Results if Part I Crime Tripled in FY 2001/2002:

	Goal (% Below)	Actual	If All Part I Crime Rates Tripled in Sunnyvale in '01/02
National	54.00%	64.90%	55.83%
State	63.00%	68.12%	59.89%
County	38.00%	50.85%	38.15%

Appendix D: *Approximate Actual Hours Charged to Patrol Activities Compared to the Estimated Hours Spent on Those Activities Using CAD Methodology*

Activity	Patrol Hours Charged FY 2001/2002	Avg. Percentage of Patrol Hours Attributed to this Activity in P10 and P11 of FY 2002/2003	Estimated Actual Hours Spent by Activity in FY 2001/2002	Amount (under)/over charged	Dollar Value
Provide Patrol (412000)	38,301	67.32%	81,086	(42,785)	$ (2,588,468)
Respond to Non Emergency Calls (412020)	34,568	23.1%	27,823	6,745	$ 408,043
Respond to Urgent Calls (412030)	11,322	2.475%	2,981	8,341	$ 504,625
Respond to Emergency Calls (412040)	6,782	0.99%	1,192	5,590	$ 338,169
Provide Prisoner Transport (412060)	2,449	1.975%	2,379	70	$ 4,244
Patrol Follow Up Investigations (412140)	5,654	0.415%	500	5,154	$ 311,826
Conduct Collision Investigations (412210)	2,424*	1.155%	1,391	1,033	$ 62,486
Provide Traffic Enforcement (412220)	14,514*	2.545%	3,065	11,449	$ 692,640
Abandoned Vehicle Abatement (412430)	4,434	0.025%	30	4,404	$ 266,435
Total	120,448	100.00%	120,448	0	$ 0

With the exception of traffic-related activities, the column labeled "Patrol Hours Charged in FY 2001/2002" shows the actual number of hours patrol staff charged to those activities. *Note that the traffic-related activity hours were estimated. The column labeled "Percentage of Patrol Hours Attributed to this Activity in P10 and P11 of FY 2002/2003" represents the average proportion of work hours attributed to each activity as derived from the CAD system for FY 2002/2003 Accounting Periods 10 and 11. The next column is that percentage applied to the 120,448 total hours charged in FY 2001/2002. The column labeled "Amount (Under)/Over Charged" depicts the difference between the hours actually charged and the estimated hours spent. The final column estimates the dollar value of the difference in hours. The dollar value estimate is based on the FY 2001/2002 budgeted straight time rate, including benefits, for a Public Safety Officer II.

The data presented here should be construed only as a rough estimate for three reasons. First, Periods 10 and 11 represent only 15% of the fiscal year. Second, the CAD data itself is generated by human activity and therefore is subject to human error. The degree of that error is unknown. Third, the percentage of time in each activity is taken from one

year and applied to the prior year. It's possible that demand for service was somewhat different across the two years.

Appendix E: *Issues with the Index Score of the Budget/Cost Ratio*

The following discussion presents some of the major issues with the citywide budget/cost ratio measure and index scores.

First, the ratio result is confusing: a result of more than 1.0 equals "savings" and a result of less than 1.0 means the program is over budget.

Second, this measure would be more appropriate if reported at the department level only. Reporting the ratio at the program level artificially inflates the index score because it provides points for "savings" in one program when those dollars have actually been spent by another program. Even though another program may be over budget, there is not a corresponding impact on the index score. The chart below illustrates how this occurred in FY 2001/2002 in the Department of Public Safety. At the department level, Public Safety met its budget, and therefore achieved a budget/cost ratio of 1.00. This translates to an index score of 100. The weight for the measure is 4. Therefore, the cumulative weighted index score should be (100*4) = 400. However, by calculating each budget/cost ratio separately, the cumulative weighted index score is 2,158, for an average per program of 432.

Program	Budgeted Dollars	Actual Dollars	Difference	Actual Ratio	Budgeted Ratio	Index	Council Weight	Wtd Index
412	19,543,536	18,587,828	955,708	1.05	1	105.14	4	420.56
422	14,661,574	14,197,545	464,029	1.03	1	103.27	4	413.08
432	8,441,340	10,020,992	(1,579,652)	0.84	1	84.24	4	336.96
452	525,839	354,369	171,470	1.48	1	148.39	4	593.56
453	650,010	660,465	(10,455)	0.98	1	98.42	4	393.68
Average Program Weighted Index								431.6
Total	43,822,299	43,821,199	1,100	1.00	1	100.003	4	400.01

Actual Ratio = Budgeted dollars divided by Actual dollars

Index = Actual Ratio, divided by Budgeted Ratio, times 100

Weighted index = Index * Council weight

In addition, notice the weighted index score in program 452. By under-spending $171,470, they were able to obtain a 593.56 weighted index score. This score is 193.56 points above the equilibrium score (400 points if planned = actual). Now, focus on the weighted index score for program 432. By overspending $1,579,652, they obtained a 336.96 weighted index score. This score is only 63.04 below the equilibrium score (400). This observation demonstrates that "savings" more heavily influences the weighted index score than "overspending." Hence, one dollar saved has more effect than one dollar

overspent. This means that even if one program is severely overspent, a much smaller savings in another program will counterbalance the aggregate weighted index score. This was the case above, where savings in program 452 of $171,470 more than balanced the $1,579,652 overspent in program 432.

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Program-wide Findings and Recommendations		1. Audit staff estimates nearly 43,000 Patrol Division work hours, worth an estimated $2.6 million, were charged to incorrect activities in FY 2001/2002.	1. Audit staff recommends that alternative methodologies be developed and presented – along with their pros and cons – for comparison to both the timecard system and the present methodology. Keeping in mind that every methodology has benefits and drawbacks, the City's policymakers should evaluate the tradeoffs between the various historical, current and as-yet-untried methodologies and select for implementation the preferred alternatives. Those methodologies should be codified in new SOPs.	Concur. New methodology has been developed and is currently in use which is improving the accuracy of reporting. This method uses computer-aided dispatched data to complete budget accounting. Accuracy can be certified in future audits. The new methods are being codified in SOPs in the new restructure. No further action required (NFAR).	Implement
		2. Although Police Services is responsible for little more than two dozen activities, management greatly complicated reporting on the program's results by implementing numerous "sub-activities" that doubled the number of codes used to track officers' time.	2. Staff should eliminate all sub-activities from this program except those for which there is a clear, specific need for such highly specific data.	Concur. Subactivities have been eliminated in the restructured budget. NFAR.	Implement
		3. The extensiveness of inaccurate data reported, and interviews with staff, suggest that staff has in the past perceived the City's outcome-based budget/reporting system as a lot of work in exchange for little programmatic value.	3. The Finance Department, the Office of the City Manager and the Department of Public Safety should collaboratively address this issue as part of the department restructure so that DPS staff find the new measures and activities to be "value added" instead of simply burdensome. In addition, a training program with an intensive support component for Public Safety staff may help to eliminate some of the frustration. Lastly, improvement of the calculation procedures so that they provide clear direction would serve to reduce the difficulty involved in trying to report on program performance.	Concur. The budget has been restructured and approved by Council with new measures that will improve the measures' value, although several are still somewhat complicated. Training has been completed by the Deputy City Manager this year with assistance from a consultant. In addition, managers will be working with budgets and measures they developed which is expected to significantly increase accuracy and management attention to these issues. Calculations are defined in the SOPs. NFAR.	Implement

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
		4. Most of the program's outcome measures are poorly designed: they are convoluted, ineffectual and complex.	4. As part of the current restructure, staff should carefully re-evaluate the measures to ensure that they are focused on the essence of the program's efforts and that the measures themselves – and their results – have meaning and thus value. The measures should be designed such that data undergoes minimal contortion and such that staff has a reasonable chance of success in capturing and manipulating the data used to report results.	Concur. See above. Future audit and experience will confirm the value of measures or lead to adjustments. NFAR.	Implement
		5. Virtually all of the program's existing SOPs provide insufficient guidance to staff in capturing data and reporting results.	5. After revamping the measures, staff should prepare straightforward, detailed procedures for reporting results and should "test" those procedures prior to implementation.	Concur. Procedures and testing are in process. NFAR.	Implement
Findings and Recommendations for Measures					
Program Measure	**1** An average seven-year weighted FBI crime index crime rate.	1. The measure masks trends and changes in criminal activity in Sunnyvale. Since this measure "purees" together different types of crimes, crime rates in four jurisdictions, a set of arbitrary weights, and seven years' worth of data, meaningful information about crime in Sunnyvale is camouflaged.	1. Change the measure to report comparative, non-weighted data for each crime type. For instance, staff can report that the homicide rate in Sunnyvale was X% lower than in Santa Clara County.	The Department of Finance and City Manager have reviewed this outcome with approval by City Council for FY 2004/2005. In the restructure of DPS, changing this measure to a 3-year rolling average and comparing our end of year results to this average will accurately portray our annual results against a meaningful measurement. Individual crime statistics are tracked by the Department and are available for reporting as needed. It should also be noted that the State of California is considering moving away from the California Crime Index for reporting purposes. This measure will be re-evaluated for the FY 2005/2006 budget year.	Implement

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
		2. It would have been very difficult for Police Services to have failed to meet the FY 2001/2002 goals.	2. Establish new goals, by crime type, based on historical actual crime rates.	Concur. Done in the new budget structure.	Implement
		3. This statistic says nothing about crime rates in Sunnyvale -- only about the City's rates relative to others' rates.	3. Create an additional new measure that illustrates changes in the amount of crime in Sunnyvale.	As stated above, DPS has created a measure illustrating the crime rate over a 3-year average. End of year results will portray reported crime in the local community more accurately when compared to this average.	Implement
		4. The statistic captures only relative changes in the occurrence of index crimes while ignoring changes in other types of crimes that have significant impact on the community.	4. In another, non-comparative measure (such as Outcome Measure #7), the City may wish to consider including measures that address non-index crimes.	Do not concur. This is not done in the new restructure. Although data is available and easily reported in other formats or venues. There are too many crimes to be considered here which would over-complicate the reporting process.	Council to review which crimes to consider during next operating budget process. Number should be limited. (5 or less)
		5. This measure has been calculated by comparing data for the county, state and national crime rates to data from more recent years for Sunnyvale crime rates.	5. The City should not compare its data from Year A to external data from Year B, even if the City must use old data to report on this measure.	Generally concur and correct now, but it must be understood that you are comparing old data.	Implement
		6. Staff did not adequately document the data used to calculate this measure. Although the calculations used to create the statistic are well documented, the underlying data used is not.	6. Staff should retain, for at least five years, all data and worksheets used to calculate reported results.	Do not concur. Can be done even though data will be old. Recommend that old data and worksheets be retained only through the next audit.	Implement 5 year retention
		7. Using the same data for the number of crimes used to calculate clearance rates, the audit staff was unable to replicate the reported crime rate for robbery, aggravated assault and burglary. The audit staff was able to replicate the rates reported for murder and rape crimes.	7. Staff should clearly document the data and assumptions used in calculating reported results. Data regarding the number of crimes that occurred in Sunnyvale should be consistent across different measures.	Concur. Done.	Implement

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Program Measure	**2** An average seven-year weighted clearance rate for crimes.	1. This measure has been calculated by comparing old data for state and national crime rates to relatively new data for Sunnyvale crime rates.	1. The City should not compare its data from Year A to external data from Year B, even if the City must use old data to report on this measure.	Concur. Done. See #5 above.	Implement
		2. The measure masks trends/changes in crimes solved in Sunnyvale and the need for resources.	2. Eliminate the weights and report comparative data for each crime type.	Concur. Done.	Implement
		3. If the statistic were to move dramatically, the reader would not know what was driving the change.	3. Eliminate the weights and report comparative data for each crime type.	Concur. Done.	Implement
		4. This statistic says nothing about rates of Sunnyvale's clearance rates – only about the City's rates relative to others' rates.	4. Since it is already calculated in order to report the existing statistic, audit staff recommends reporting Sunnyvale's clearance rates along with those of the other jurisdictions.	Concur. Done.	Implement
		5. The statistic captures only relative changes in clearances of selected crimes, while ignoring clearance rates in other types of crimes.	5. The City may wish to expand the crimes for which its own clearance rates are reported.	Do not concur. Data is too extensive. Can be reported in other formats as needed. Does not need to be part of the budget.	Council to review which crimes to consider during next operating budget process. Number should be limited. (5 or less)
		6. This statistic gives undue weight to a few crimes, which can create a falsely positive or negative impression of the program's overall success in solving crimes.	6. Remove the weights from the calculation.	Concur. Done.	Implement
Program Measure	**3** Budget/Cost ratio.	1. The result was properly calculated and reported.	1. The measure should be re-examined on a citywide basis due to its potential to artificially inflate the index score.	Concur. Although this is a Finance issue.	Implement
Program Measure	**4** A traffic collision ratio per million miles traveled at the previous 3-yr avg is achieved.	1. Because the actual 3-year average is not reported as part of the result, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the goal.	1. At a minimum, the actual 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that there is a record of whether the goal was met or not.	Concur. Done in the new structure. Changed to rolling three-year average in the new calculations and report.	Implement
		2. The meaning of this measure is difficult to grasp.	2. Staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled.	Do not concur. Based upon data sources, we have the data for million miles traveled from the Public Works Department.	Do Not Implement
Program Measure	**5** A community perception of safety rating of 85% is achieved.	1. The percent reported was substantiated by the documentation supplied to the audit team.	1. None.	N/A	N/A

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Program Measure	6 A response time to emergency police calls for assistance.	1. There is an inconsistency between the number of calls used to calculate Emergency response times and the number of Emergency calls reported in the emergency call activity.	1. Figures used to report call volume should be consistent with those used to report response times. 2. The program might benefit from a new activity in which to capture the number of police responses to fire emergencies and a new program measure to capture police response times to fire emergencies.	Concur. Done.	Implement
		2. The "adjusted" list of both emergency and urgent calls included a number of response times that were "0." Inclusion of instances in which officers have notified dispatchers that they have come upon a scene in a measure meant to reflect officers' ability to speedily respond to dispatched emergencies violates the purpose and value of the measure.	3. The written procedures (SOPs) should specify that only those calls that are not self initiated are to be used to calculate the reportable results for this measure.	Do not concur. Will continue to use all responses to reflect response time to all calls for service.	Implement
		3. "Emergency calls" (Priority E) are somewhat arbitrarily defined and do not necessarily conform to expectations of what constitutes an "emergency."	4. As part of the restructure, Public Safety management may wish to evaluate these priorities and possibly research whether these priorities are consistent with public expectations and/or standard police practices.	During the budget process for FY 2005/2006, the definitions for response times for police calls will be re-evaluated. It is anticipated these definitions will be defined as Emergency Event, Police Event, Directed Patrol, Community Policing/Problem Solving, and, Non-Directed Patrol. The priority of the call and response is determined by standard police practices. At the beginning of each budget year, the priority of call response will be established for the fiscal year and remain unchanged until the next budget year.	Implement
		5. Staff has been reporting the call that is at the 90th percentile. The phrase "90% of the time" could be construed to mean something other than the value of the call at the 90th percentile of all calls. For instance, it could be construed to mean the average of 90 percent of all calls.	5. For clarity, the measures could be refined as follows: "The percent of emergency police calls for assistance with response times under 7 minutes (from time received by dispatch)" and, "The percent of urgent police calls for assistance with response times under 11 minutes (from time received by dispatch), with the goals set at 90%.	Concur. Changed in the new structure.	Implement
		6. The measure is really two different measures and no current SOP exists for those measures.	6. Create two measures – one for urgent calls and one for emergency calls and prepare procedures for each measure.	Concur. Changed in the new structure.	Implement
		NA	7. Data should be extracted via the saved report entitled "Call Processing Time for PD Calls" in the CAD Activity Reporting System (CARS) database.	Concur. Currently being done.	Implement

FY 2001/2002 Review of Police Services (Program 412)
Department Response

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Program Measure	7 A dollar loss per citizen due to crime and traffic collisions at the prior 3-year avg.	1. A mathematical error was made in the calculation of the dollar loss for auto accidents.	1. Reconstruct this measure so that it captures more information about both workload and performance. The audit team and staff recommend two new measures: "The number of serious crimes… is at or below the prior 3-year average" and "The number of traffic accidents is at or below the prior 3-year average."	Concur. In FY 2004/2005, this measure has been deleted from the new budget structure.	Implement
		2. The measure contains so many disparate elements that reported results are meaningless.	See above.	See above.	See above
		3. Because the actual 3-year average is not reported as part of the result, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the goal.	See above.	See above.	See above
		4. The values used to estimate the "dollar loss" for crime are in fact an estimated value for loss from accidental injuries and deaths. It does not necessarily follow that the estimates are interchangeable.	See above.	See above.	See above
		5. The value of stolen property is extremely difficult to estimate and will vary widely based on which officer takes the report. Such estimates may misrepresent the actual value of stolen goods as officers are not trained to value stolen property. Given that these highly variable and unsubstantiated figures represent the largest portion of the basis for the calculation of this statistic further calls into question the validity of the measure as an indicator of the program's efforts to combat crime.	See above.	See above.	See above
Program Measure	8 An overall customer satisfaction rating of 85% for Police Services.	1. The percentage reported was appropriately calculated by staff and substantiated by the documentation supplied to the audit team.	NA	N/A	N/A
Possible Program Measure	No existing measure.	NA	1. The program does not have a measure to report conviction rates or complaints issued by the District Attorney. Police Services should consider including such a measure.	Concur. New measure has been developed and is located in Program 485 at the program level.	Implement

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
SDP 41201 Crime Control and Public Order Maintenance	**1** An average seven-year weighted FBI crime index crime rate per 100,000 population.	1. See findings for Program Outcome Measure #1.	1. See recommendations for Program Outcome Measure #1.	See same response.	See same
SDP 41201 Crime Control and Public Order Maintenance	**2** An average seven-year weighted clearance rate for the Part I crimes.	1. See findings for Program Outcome Measure #2.	1. See recommendations for Program Outcome Measure #2.	See same response.	See same
SDP 41201 Crime Control and Public Order Maintenance	**3** An avg response time to emergency police calls for assistance.	1. Findings 1-4 and 6 for Program Outcome Measure #6 apply to this measure as well.	1. Recommendations 1-4 and 6-7 for Program Outcome Measure #6 apply to this measure as well.	See same response.	See same
SDP 41201 Crime Control and Public Order Maintenance	**4** A dollar loss per citizen - due to property crime - at the prior 3-yr avg.	1. The findings associated with the property crime component of Program Outcome Measure #7 apply to this measure as well.	1. Audit staff recommends eliminating this measure and replacing it with a measure that would "roll up" to the recommended new Program Outcome Measure #7.	Concur with eliminating measure. Dollar loss data has been dropped in the new structure. See prior explanation.	Implement
SDP 41201 Crime Control and Public Order Maintenance	**5** A community perception of safety rating of 85% is achieved.	1. This measure is identical to Program Outcome Measure # 5.	1. This measure is identical to Program Outcome Measure # 5.	See prior response.	See same
SDP 41201 Crime Control and Public Order Maintenance	**6** A customer satisfaction rating of 85% for Police Services.	1. This measure is the same as Program Outcome Measure #8.	1. This measure is the same as Program Outcome Measure #8.	See prior response.	See same
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	**1.** A ratio of traffic collisions per million miles traveled.	1. This measure is the same as Program Outcome Measure #4.	1. This measure is the same as Program Outcome Measure #4.	See prior response.	See same
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	**2.** A ratio of collisions involving bicycles per million miles traveled.	1. The result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.	1. The methodology staff used should be codified in the SOP.	Do not concur. All bicycle data has been dropped in the new budget structure. They comprise only about 3% of all accidents. We do collect the data in other forms on a regular basis and it can be reported if needed outside the budget format.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted
		2. Because the actual 3-year average is not reported as part of the result, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the goal.	2. The 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that it is apparent whether the goal was met.	See above.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
		3. Reporting the data solely in this way doesn't permit the reader to have an intuitive sense of staff performance.	3. To enhance the reader's understanding, the reportable results for this measure should include both the million-miles traveled statistic as well as the actual number of accidents that occurred.	See above.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted
		NA	4. As an alternative, staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled.	See above.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	3. A ratio of collisions involving pedestrians per million miles.	1. The result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.	1. The methodology should be codified in the SOP.	Do not concur. All pedestrian accidents have been dropped in the new budget structure. They comprise less than 2% of all accidents. The data is collected regularly by the department and can be reported as needed, but given the small number, serve no purpose as a part of the budget reporting system.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted
		2. Because the actual 3-year average is not reported, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the 3-year average or not.	2. The actual 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that it is apparent whether the goal was met.	See above.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted
		3. Reporting the data solely in this way doesn't permit the reader to have an intuitive sense of staff performance.	3. To enhance the reader's understanding, the reportable results for this measure should include both the million-miles traveled statistic as well as the actual number of accidents that occurred.	See above.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted
		NA	4. As an alternative, staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled.	See above.	Do Not Implement as measure has been deleted
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	4. A ratio of number of traffic collisions wih injuries/fatalities per million miles traveled.	1. The result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.	1. The methodology should be codified in the SOP.	This has been dropped as a specialty report at the SDP level. Already reported at the program level. A new measure associated with enforcement at the highest accident locations has been added in Program 483.	Implement recommendations in new program measure
		2. Because the actual 3-year average is not reported, the reader cannot tell whether the reported result meets the 3-year average or not.	2. The actual 3-year average should be calculated and reported so that it is apparent whether the goal was met.	See above.	See above
		3. Reporting the data solely in this way doesn't permit the reader to have an intuitive sense of staff performance	3. To enhance the reader's understanding, the reportable results for this measure should include both the million-miles traveled statistic as well as the actual number of accidents that occurred	See above.	See above
		NA	4. As an alternative, staff may wish to explore the possibility of measuring accidents compared to traffic volume expressed as incidents per million vehicles, instead of per million miles traveled.	See above.	See above

FY 2001/2002 Review of Police Services (Program 412)
Department Response

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	**5.** Maintaining a dollar loss per citizen due to traffic collisions.	1. See Measure #7 for findings regarding traffic collisions.	1. See Measure #7 for recommendations regarding traffic collisions.	See same response.	See same
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	**6.** A traffic offense recidivism rate of diverted juveniles of 5%.	This measure is defunct.	N/A	N/A	N/A
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	**7.** Reports of chronic unsafe traffic conditions are followed up wihin 7 days of receiving report.	1. The result reported could not be substantiated as there is no documentation for the result reported.	1. Staff should cease reporting results for this measure until an accurate calculation method can be devised or the measure itself is revised. One alternative would be to simply report the number of unsafe traffic conditions reported to police.	Concur. A new measure has been developed in Program 483 for response to complaints.	Implement
		2. Staff has no formal mechanism to track this result.	2. Management should not use the FY 2001/2002 reported results for this measure for comparison purposes.	Concur.	Implement
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	**8.** All major injury/fatal collisions investigated, analyzed and findings/ recommendations forwarded to traffic engineering.	1. The number reported could not be substantiated. Currently there is no tracking mechanism for the distribution of reports other than on the original hard copy. Staff indicated that it would take an unreasonable amount of time and labor to "track" reports through the current distribution process.	1. Eliminate the measure. As part of a restructure, staff may wish to consider alternative measures.	Concur. Measure has been eliminated.	Implement
		2. The measure does not gauge anything meaningful; it does not measure an outcome. The timeliness with which a report is forwarded to traffic engineering is an incomplete measure of police services. Service levels are not reflected by how fast findings and recommendations are forwarded to traffic engineering.	See above.	See above.	See above
SDP 41202 - Traffic Safety	**9.** A customer satisfaction rating of 85% for Traffic Safety Services is achieved.	1. The percentage reported was appropriately calculated by staff and substantiated by the documentation supplied to the audit team.	1. None.	N/A	N/A

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Activity	**Activity 412000** Provide Police Patrol.	1. Timecards for patrol division staff customarily were filled in at the beginning of the week, prior to the work being done. The hours reported in given activities were not a reflection of actual hours worked in those activities.	1. City management should not use total cost or hours spent data reported for this activity in FY 2001/2002 as a basis for future comparisons or decision making.	Concur.	Implement
		2. The number reported could not be substantiated. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the 38,302 hours reported was less than half of the hours actually spent "patrolling" and on related administrative efforts.	2. The SOP should be revised to reflect whatever work hours calculation methodology selected by policymakers.	Concur. This is done. Now use CAD data as noted in previous explanation.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412020** Respond to non-Emergency Calls.	1. The fact that officers appear to have failed to record as many as 24,723 calls in this one activity alone is good evidence of the FY 2002/2003 program manager's assertion that officers did not accurately report their products in FY 2001/2002.	1. Management should not use total cost, hours spent or per-call cost data reported for this activity in FY 2001/2002 as a basis for future comparisons or decision-making.	Concur.	Implement
		2. Using the same methodology as described in Finding #2 of Activity 412000, there is evidence to suggest that the 34,568 work hours reported on timecards were overstated by an estimated 6,745 hours.	See above.	Concur.	Implement
		3. The SOP for this activity defines non-emergency calls as "Priority 3, 4 or 6." Since the SOP was developed, call priorities have changed several times. Staff was unable to determine what types of calls were originally associated with the call priorities specified by the SOP. Police Services decided to define "non-emergency" calls as the Patrol staff's response to "Priority 3 and 8" calls in the FY 2001/2002 labeling system. Audit staff believes these exclusions were reasonable.	2. The SOP should be revised to list the complete call types included in each category, as opposed to listing only the "priority" numbers.	Do not concur. Listing is too voluminous. Call types are listed elsewhere and can be easily reproduced.	Implement - Requires listing in SOP only

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
		4. The nature of "urgent" calls is somewhat arbitrarily defined, and does not necessarily conform to common sense expectations. The "urgent" response category includes disparate types of calls – ranging from robberies, assaults and rapes to bomb threats, check forgeries and indecent exposure.	3. The city should examine which call types are classified as "emergency," "urgent," and "non-emergency" and consider re-classifying some calls on the basis of the maximum length of time that could be construed as an appropriate response. For instance, staff may wish to attempt to respond to a given type of call within 7 minutes or 11 minutes. The city should consider benchmarking those call types.	During the budget process for FY 2005/2006, the definitions for response times for police calls will be re-evaluated. It is anticipated these definitions will be defined as Emergency Event, Police Event, Directed Patrol, Community Policing/Problem Solving, and, Non-Directed Patrol. The priority of the call and response is determined by standard police practices. At the beginning of each budget year, the priority of call response will be established for the fiscal year and remain unchanged until the next budget year.	Implement Department Recommendation
		NA	4. Call types that are substantially similar, for instance – "child steal" and "kidnapping" – should be evaluated for possible consolidation.	The audit recommendation may have merit as a general observation. Although, the call type is defined consistent with the Penal Code and alerts the responding officer(s) to the potential situation they are responding to consistent with standard operating procedure. This information, combined with the priority of the call, determines the proper response for various types of calls.	Do Not Implement
		NA	5. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same
Activity	**Activity 412030** Respond to Urgent Calls.	1. The SOP provides inadequate direction regarding what calls are included in Priority 2, and how or when the data should be cleaned for reporting purposes.	1. The SOP should contain a list of call types that are included in "Priority 2." In addition, the SOP should establish clear procedures for downloading the calls and for determining what calls, if any, should be omitted from the total reported in this activity and in the corresponding program outcome measure.	Concur. Done in the restructure.	Implement
		2. Using the same methodology described in Activity 412000, audit staff estimates that the patrol work hours charged to this activity were overstated by about 8,300 hours. The extra hours charged here should have been charged to the general patrol time activity (412000.)	2. Management should not use total cost, hours spent or per-call cost data reported for this activity in FY 2001/2002 as a basis for future comparisons or decision-making.	Concur.	Implement
		NA	3. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Activity	Activity 412040 - Respond to Emergency Calls.	1. The number of emergency calls reported here (1,255) is substantially higher than the number of emergency calls (244) used to calculate response times in program measure #6 and SDP 41201 #3. Taken together, the reported results and products indicate that the emergency response time reported as a program outcome is based on 1,255 calls, when in fact the response time reported applies to less than 20% of those calls.	1. Although the discrepancy in the number of calls used to report call volume and call response times for the same type of calls is understandable given the poor SOPs, for purposes of consistency, the same data should be used for both. The SOPs should be revised so that there is no inconsistency in the figures used for this activity and its related outcome measures.	Concur. Done.	Implement
		2. Using the same methodology described in Activity 412000, the number of hours used in this activity is estimated to have been overstated by about 5,600 hours. (See Appendix D.) This overstated the cost of the activity by an estimated $338,000.	2. Management should not use the FY 2001/2002 reported total cost or product cost data for this activity for future comparisons or decision-making.	Concur.	Implement
		NA	3. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same
Activity	Activity 412050 Provide Police Contracted OT.	1. It appears that 55 hours were erroneously charged to this activity.	1. Although this methodology conflicts with the existing SOP, which calls for officers to record products on their timecards, this method appears to be the most reliable mechanism for preventing events being left out of the final count or events being counted more than once.	Concur. New measure and SOP in Program 483 and in the restructure.	Implement
Activity	Activity 412060 - Provide Prisoner Transport.	1. The final number of reported products is not reflective of a count of actual trips taken. The actual number of trips could not be determined and could be higher or lower than reported.	1. The SOP should be revised to establish a methodology to capture the number of trips made. The SOP should also broaden the definition of trips to include transport to all locations, such as hospitals and other detention facilities.	During the budget process for FY 2005/2006, the definition for this measure will be re-evaluated to identify if any change is necessary in the calculation of a product. Products will be counted based on the number of trips or the number of prisoners transported. In FY 2003/2004, the calculation methodology for this measure was changed to identify one product for each trip to the Santa Clara County Jail. In FY 2004/2005, the SOP has been revised to accurately account for the entire police event including transport to any other facility prior to or including booking.	Implement
		NA	2. Management should not use reported FY 2001/2002 products reported or product cost in this activity as a basis for future comparison or decision-making.	Concur.	Implement
		NA	3. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Activity	**Activity 412250 -** Provide Field Admin - SLES.	NA	NA	NA	N/A
Activity	**Activity 412350 -** Crime Control and Order Maintenance.	NA	NA	NA	N/A
Activity	**Activity 412430 -** AVASA Abatement Program.	1. There is no SOP for this activity. Given that, staff's attempt to count calls for service as abated vehicles appears reasonable. However, it should be noted that calls for service are not necessarily synonymous with actual abatement activity.	1. Management should decide whether use of calls for service as a proxy for actual abatement activity is sufficient. An appropriate SOP that reflects the policy decision should be developed. Audit staff recommends consideration of tracking vehicles abated separately from calls for abatement service.	Do not concur. This is an activity that time is charged to. If we simply track vehicles abated, it would not be reflective of the call volume.	Develop appropriate SOP
		2. Audit staff estimates that some 4,400 hours were erroneously charged to this activity that should have been charged to the general patrol activity in FY 2001/2002. An alternative explanation is that CAD does not accurately reflect the amount of time officers spent on abatement.	2. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same
Activity	**Activity 412070 -** Provide Crime Prevention Services.	1. The products reported in FY 2001/2002 were not reported accurately. Out of the two periods reviewed, the audit team found discrepancies between the number of hours listed on the weekly log sheets and the totals reported for each period.	1. Crime prevention staff should consider consolidating the different weekly log sheets and speaker request forms used to report fiscal year results.	Concur. New tracking system has been developed.	Implement
		NA	2. Staff should consider storing the data electronically to prevent the need for manual counting and improve the accuracy of reported products.	Concur. Awaiting automation of this process.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412080 -** Provide Crime Prevention Administration.	NA	NA	N/A	N/A
Activity	**Activity 412090 -** Provide School Liaison.	1. Staff reported 2,720 products on the MBO. The audit team counted 2,811 products as listed on each officer's log sheet that they should have reported.	1. The SOP should be revised to specify a tracking methodology that would prevent double counting of products and that would clarify what constitutes a product.	Concur. Done in the restructure.	Implement

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
		2. It seems likely that the officers' reported products are higher than the actual number of school visits made. Based on the hours charged, officers reported visiting one school for every hour and 23 minutes worked. The FY 02/03 program manager indicated that officers were recording products when they visited schools and also when they undertook planning efforts associated with their pending school visits. Additionally, the SOP does not provide a mechanism for ensuring that products are not double counted.	2. Staff should consider storing the data electronically to prevent the need for manual counting and improve the accuracy of reported products.	Concur. New database and design process awaiting automation.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412100 -** Provide Juvenile Probation Services.	1. There is inadequate documentation of the products reported.	1. Management should not use the reported FY 2001/2002 products or product cost as the basis for future comparisons or decision making.	Concur.	Implement
		NA	2. The SOP should be revised to specify a procedure for counting and documenting products. For instance, the SOP could specify what counts as an "intervention contact."	Concur. Done.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412110 -** Provide Investigations Administration.	NA	NA	N/A	N/A
Activity	**Activity 412120 -** Maintain Liaison with Court, DA and City Attorney.	NA	NA	N/A	N/A
Activity	**Activity 412130 -** Appear in court.	NA	1. Management may wish to consider changing the product from work hours to court cases to make the true product cost visible.	Concur. In the FY 2005/2006 budget process, this measure will be re-evaluated to further define court appearances. The definition will address the reporting of products for this measure based on the number of cases versus the individual appearances in an effort to determine the true cost for court appearances.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412140 -** Provide Patrol Follow-up Investigation.	1. There is no practical method by which audit staff could verify the products. Therefore, audit staff offers no opinion as to their accuracy.	1. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same
		2. Audit staff estimates that the work hours in this activity were overstated by about 5,150.	NA	No response.	NA

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Activity	**Activity 412150 -** Investigate persons crimes.	1. The products reported by staff accurately reflect the total number of persons crimes reported to the police. However, whether or not a case has been "actively" investigated, or investigated at all, cannot be determined by the documentation.	1. Staff should only count those cases that have been investigated in the course of the fiscal year by the Investigations Bureau. The SOP should be revised to specify which cases are to be counted.	Recommendation could be done but should be done with an automated case management system that is not currently available.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412160 -** Investigate Property Crime.	1. The products reported accurately reflect the total number of property crimes reported to the police. However, whether or not a case is being "actively" investigated, or investigated at all, cannot be determined by the documentation.	1. Staff should only count those cases that have been investigated in the course of the fiscal year by the Investigations Bureau. The SOP should be revised to specify which cases are to be counted. Staff should decide which specific cases should be counted for this measure and specify the criteria in the SOP.	See above.	Implement

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Activity	**Activity 412170 -** Conduct Vice/Narcotics Investigations.	1. The total products reported in FY 2001/2002 was inaccurate. The documentation supplied to the audit team was an "Investigations Statistics" sheet from all Periods in FY 2001/2002 listing a total of 282 under Activity 412170. The "Activity Log Sheets," however, show a total of 223 apparent investigations.	1. The SOP should be revised so that it gives a clear indication as to what counts as a case investigated. In addition, the calculation method in the SOP should make reference to the "Activity Log Sheet."	Concur. Done in restructure.	Implement
		2. The SOP is unclear as to what counts as a narcotics/vice case investigated. The categories on the "Activity Log Sheet" provide some indication, but the SOP should specifically state when a case should be entered into the log sheet.	2. If possible, staff should consider tracking the products electronically. This would save staff time and might make the products reported more accurate.	Refer to above comments on case management system.	Implement A capital project for a Case Management System could be funded through Asset Forfeiture
Activity	**Activity 412180 -** Collect and Process Physical Evidence.	1. The number reported could not be substantiated by the audit team. There was no documentation available for the 6,933 cases investigated. The SOP does not require documentation beyond the timecard itself.	1. The SOP should be revised so that it gives a clear indication as to what counts as a case investigated. In addition, staff should keep a listing of all the cases investigated with the name of the investigator, date of incident, case number, and status of investigation.	All separate activities related to collection of physical evidence have been dropped in the restructure.	Implement
		2. The SOP is unclear as to what counts as a case investigated.	2. The activity should be restructured so that the sub-activity products, if they are needed at all, "roll-up" into a total number of cases investigated. Alternatively, the subactivities could be eliminated.	See above.	Implement
		3. This activity has several sub-activities with incompatible products. For example, one of the sub-activities measures "physical evidence" that is processed (412182). However, the SOP for the activity states that "a product is one case investigated."	3. Management should not use the FY 2001/2002 products reported for decision making or comparison in the future. Until the sub-activities problem is resolved, no products should be reported for this activity.	Concur.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412240 -** Conduct Crime Analysis.	1. The products reported could not be substantiated by the audit team. There is no documentation available describing the substance, type, dates, or authors of the 384 reports. The SOP indicates that staff is supposed to count "Crime Analysis Reports," but this is not defined.	1. The SOP should be revised so that it requires staff to track the number of reports as well as the report names and dates on a log sheet. A log sheet would provide a more comprehensive reference as to the number of Crime Analysis reports produced. The SOP should also clearly state what type of reports count as products for this measure.	Concur. Done.	Implement
Activity	**Activity 412370** Criminal Investigation.	NA	NA	N/A	NA

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
Activity	Activity 412190 - Provide Traffic Administration.	NA	NA	N/A	NA
Activity	Activity 412200 - Provide Traffic Safety Education.	1. The FY 2001/2002 result was recorded per the existing SOP. However, due to the nature of the calculation methodology, the reported result cannot be substantiated because there is no supporting documentation available that shows how many events and how many participant hours per event were completed.	1. The calculation method in the SOP should be revised to require development of a log listing the event, the number of participants and the time spent to enable documentation of the result reported.	This activity is eliminated in the new structure.	Do Not Implement Measure Deleted
Activity	Activity 412210 Conduct collision investigations.	1. The products reported accurately reflect the total number of collisions reported to the police. However, whether or not a case was "actively" investigated cannot be determined by the documentation. In FY 2001/2002, all collisions were counted as products.	1. Police staff should revise the SOP so that the calculation method distinguishes between collisions reported and collisions investigated. The SOP should contain a clear indication as to what counts as a collision investigated and how such investigations should be tracked. Whether this involves writing a report or closing a case incident on the CAD system, the SOP should explicitly states what counts as a case investigated.	Do not concur. There is now a separation in the restructure between those collisions investigated by patrol versus the specialized traffic unit. All collisions are investigated to some extent. SOP in process.	Implement Department recommendations and develop appropriate SOPs
		2. Using the methodology as described in the section on Activity 412000, audit staff estimates that about 1,000 hours were charged to this activity in FY 2001/2002 that should have been charged to the general patrol activity.	2. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same
Activity	Activity 412220- Provide traffic control/direction.	1. The products reported could not be substantiated by the audit team. The basis of the reported products is unknown. The SOP is unclear as it defines the product as "one location where traffic control is conducted or one crossing guard post day patrolled each day."	1. The SOP should be re-written with specific instructions indicating how the products should be defined, tracked and reported.	Concur. SOPs in process. Traffic control direction may show in patrol, specialized traffic enforcement, or crossing guard services.	Implement
		NA	2. Management should not use FY 2001/2002 reported products or product cost for future comparison or decision-making. Until an appropriate tracking methodology is in place per Recommendation #1, products reported for this activity should be listed as "Not Available."	Concur.	Implement
Activity	Activity 412230 - Provide Traffic Enforcement.	1. The revised result reported was substantiated by the documentation provided to the audit team.	1. Edit the calculation methodology in the SOP to state that the products are taken from the CAD system. Specifically, staff should count the total number of Priority 4 calls.	Traffic enforcement is now again divided between patrol and the specialized traffic enforcement unit in Program 483.	Update SOP for clear definition of products and count only specialized traffic enforcement products

OUTCOME LEVEL	MEASURE	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	DEPARTMENT RESPONSE	DISPOSITION
		2. Audit staff estimates that about 11,450 patrol time work hours were erroneously charged to this activity in FY 2001/2002 that should have been charged to the general patrol activity.	2. See Recommendation #2 for Activity 412000.	See same response.	See same
Activity	**Activity 412380 -** Traffic Safety.	NA	NA	NA	NA